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Scott R. Eberle

Portrait of Scott R. Eberle

Scott is a shareholder in the Professional Liability Department with over 20 years of experience defending professionals against malpractice and other professional liability claims. He often defends lawyers against claims of malpractice and malicious prosecution. Scott also has extensive experience counseling lawyers on professional ethics and professional responsibility matters, including those facing disciplinary charges before the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as well as matters before the Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security, the Pennsylvania Judicial Board and the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission. While his practice is largely focused on defending lawyers and law firms, he also frequently defends accountants, engineers, real estate agents, insurance agents and design professionals in a variety of professional liability lawsuits.  

Scott is well known within the Pennsylvania legal community and is a frequent speaker at industry events. Among his many professional memberships, he is a member of the House of Delegates of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Co-Vice Chair of its Professional Liability Committee. He is also active in the Allegheny County Bar Association where he is a member of the Ethics and Lawyer Professional Liability Committee. Additionally, he is a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Scott chaired the Ethics & Legal Malpractice Team at a Pittsburgh-based firm.  A graduate of Duquesne University School of Law and DePauw University, he is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Court of Federal Claims.
 

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2002)
    • DePauw University (B.A., 1999)
    • Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Federal Claims
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2010, 2013, 2015-2017)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association, Member of Ethics & Lawyer Professional Liability Committee
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Member of House of Delegates & Co-Vice Chair of Professional Liability Commitee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Member
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, September 2025
    • “Ethically Terminating the Attorney-Client Relationship,” Allegheny County Bar Association (Sorg Forum), May 2025
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2024
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Beaver County Bar Association, November 2023 
    • "Ethics Considerations," Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2023
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, August 2023 
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Westmoreland County Bar Association, June 2023
    • "Avoiding Legal Malpractice," Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 2023
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, September 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Clearfield County Bar Association, September 2022
    • “Risk Management for Pennsylvania Attorneys,” INtegrity First Corporation, September 2022
    • “The Ethics of Representing Entities and Their Employees,” panelist, Allegheny County Bar Association, May 2022
    • “Ethically Responding to Negative Online Reviews and Lawyer Blogging,” Allegheny County Bar Association, February 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice – How to Get Sued in 10 Easy Steps,” Erie County Bar Association, December 2021
    • “Ethics Considerations – Responding to Negative Online Reviews,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2021
    • “Ethics Refresher for Paralegals,” Pittsburgh Paralegal Association, August 2021
    • “Ethically Terminating the Lawyer-Client Relationship,” Panelist, PBI Family Law Institute, April 2021
    • “Ethics of Medical Marijuana,” panelist, Allegheny County Bar Association, April 2021
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Criminal Law Update, December 2020
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2020
    • “Ethics and Social Media,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute, October 2019
    • “Avoiding Ethical Jams, Documenting the Representation,” Erie County Bar Association, May 2019
    • “Who Exactly is Your Client?” Pennsylvania Bar Institute, March 2019
    • “Cyber Liability and Duties of a Lawyer in the Event of a Data Breach,” Allegheny County Bar Association, December 2018

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Bar Association Formal Opinion 2025-100 Reinforces Written Fee Agreements as Essential for Compliance and Risk Management

January 1, 2026

In Formal Opinion 2025-100, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility emphasizes the importance of written fee arrangements. The recent Opinion clarifies the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 (Fees) and discusses recommended best practices to reduce disciplinary and malpractice risk. Rule 1.5(b) requires that when a lawyer has not regularly represented a client, the basis or rate of the fee must be communicated to the client in writing before or within a reasonable time after commencement of the representation. A written communication of fees is mandatory in nearly all engagements. The only exception applies when a lawyer has regularly represented the client. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct do not define “regularly,” comment [1] to the Rule explains that the exception applies where the client has an evolved understanding of the fees to be charged. The Opinion underscores that contingent fee arrangements are treated differently. Under Rule 1.5(c), a written fee agreement is always required for a contingent fee, regardless of the lawyer’s prior relationship with the client. The written contingent fee agreement must specify how the fee and expenses will be calculated. Additionally, at the conclusion of a contingent fee matter, a written closing statement showing the outcome of the matter, the remittance to the client, and the method of the determination of the fee is also required. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct only require a written statement of the basis or rate of the fee, the Committee strongly recommends a more comprehensive written fee agreement, countersigned by the client, as a best practice to avoid malpractice claims and disciplinary complaints. Fee agreements that go beyond the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 protect the rights and interests of both the lawyer and the client, prevent misunderstandings, and ensure the lawyer’s compliance with their communication obligations under Rule 1.4. The Committee suggests that a written fee agreement can be used to clarify, among other things, the identity of the client, the scope of the representation, and the expectations and obligations of both lawyer and client. The Opinion also reminds lawyers that the writing required by Rule 1.5 must be retained for at least five years after termination of the attorney-client relationship pursuant to Rule 1.15(c). Formal Opinion 2025-100 ultimately reinforces that written fee communications protect both clients and lawyers and are an essential part the lawyer-client relationship. Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. 

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

September 1, 2025

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Upholds Agreement to Arbitrate Fee Dispute in Attorney Retainer Agreement PeriRx, LLC v. Harras, Boom & Archer, LLP, Civil No. 24-2601, 2025 WL 2447788 (E.D. of Pa. August 25, 2025) (non-precedential) The plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against its attorneys arising out of the attorneys’ representation in a patent dispute. One of the plaintiff’s claims alleged that the attorneys misappropriated $490,000 of their funds that were in an escrow account.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the conversion claim, alleging the claim was covered by the arbitration provision in the parties’ retainer agreement attached as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s complaint.  The District Court construed the attorneys’ motion as a motion to compel arbitration, which they granted, finding there was a valid agreement to arbitrate fee disputes in section 4 of the retention agreement to which both parties agreed and affixed signatures.  The court further found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the attorney used funds in the escrow account to compensate herself and her firm without sufficient explanation to the plaintiff about what work those funds supposedly covered fell within the scope of the agreed upon arbitration provision. Additionally, the court compelled arbitration of a portion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim which focused on the same fee-dispute matter.    Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.