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Case Law Alerts

Third Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for Employer in Title VII Race Discrimination Case: Comparator Evidence Insufficient

Clark v. The Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 2025 WL 3516770 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)

January 1, 2026

by Mary N. Yurick

The plaintiff, a clinical pharmacist, alleged race-based discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The plaintiff claimed that his employer discriminated against him based upon his race when they issued him a first written warning and limited his work hours as discipline for “sleeping on the job.” According to the plaintiff, his employer did not impose the same discipline on other clinical pharmacists who were non-Black and who engaged in different misconduct than the plaintiff. The plaintiff attempted to argue that because the misconduct he engaged in and the misconduct the other pharmacists engaged in, while different, all could result in termination under the employer’s progressive discipline policy, they were comparators. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.

The Third Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer. In doing so, the court explained that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of race-based employment discrimination, and even if he had done so, he could not prove that his employer’s proffered reason for disciplining him was pretextual.

The court discussed that comparators do not need to be identical in establishing a prima facie case, but they must be similarly situated in “all material respects.” In that regard, the court noted that considerations include that the comparator “engaged in the same conduct.” The court found that the other pharmacists the plaintiff tried to use as comparators were not appropriate because they engaged in different misconduct with different safety risks than sleeping on the job.

The court held, “An employer’s adoption of a progressive discipline policy does not render each employee who is eligible for the same sanction ‘similarly situated’ for purposes of Title VII, particularly when the policy includes a ‘specific statement that progressive discipline is optional.’” The court concluded that the plaintiff could not meet his burden to prove a prima facie race-based employment claim with his offered comparator evidence.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.