Mary is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she concentrates her practice on the defense of employment-related claims, including, but not limited to allegations of discrimination, violation of employment-related statutes, wrongful discharge, and breach of contract. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Mary worked as an associate attorney in a boutique law firm handling a wide variety of civil litigation matters.
Mary received her juris doctor in 2011 from Rutgers School of Law – Camden where she participated in the Domestic Violence and Advanced Domestic Violence Clinics, assisting individuals in obtaining domestic violence restraining orders. After law school, Mary served as a Superior Court of New Jersey judicial law clerk to The Honorable David W. Morgan, J.S.C., in Salem and Gloucester Counties. During her clerkship, Mary served as a mediator for Small Claims and Special Civil Part cases.
A graduate of Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Mary received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science in 2008.
Mary is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals Third Circuit, the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the U.S. District Court of New Jersey and the U.S. Tax Court.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
EDPA Upholds Summary Judgment for Employer, Finding Incivility Alone Doesn’t Violate Discrimination Laws
April 1, 2026
In Pelphrey-Weingand, the plaintiff was the defendant’s assistant director/clinical supervisor – effectively the second in command. The plaintiff claimed she was subjected to “incessant mistreatment,” discrimination, retaliation, and unlawful mismanagement. Ultimately, the plaintiff was terminated just over a year into her tenure for poor performance. The plaintiff’s complaint asserted fifteen state and federal claims relating to unlawful discrimination, whistleblower, and retaliation claims. She alleged that she was the victim of discrimination based on age, disability, worker’s compensation status, race, religion, refusal to violate the FMLA, refusal to violate the Adult Protective Services Act, whistleblower status, and refusal to commit an unlawful act. In addressing plaintiff’s claims, the court specifically noted the “kitchen sink” complaint. In addressing the fact that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant employer discriminated against her on “almost every protected class imaginable,” the court stated, “[w]hile an employer so broadly hateful is, perhaps, not impossible, such allegations by their very nature strain credulity to its outer limits.” The court continued, “[t]his Court has significant doubts that any but the most specific and meritorious ‘kitchen sink’ complaint could possibly clear the bar set collectively by Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 11.” Even after being given the opportunity to narrow her claims, the plaintiff indicated that she intended to pursue all fifteen. As a result, the court spent time addressing each claim in its opinion, noting instances where co-workers may have been unkind to her and likely did not like her, the defendant employer advanced a “fulsome record” regarding the plaintiff’s failure to satisfactorily complete her job duties. The plaintiff received multiple written warnings, plans of correction, numerous one-on-one supervisions, and a final written warning before her termination. Several of the issues that the plaintiff received warnings about could have put the licensure of the defendant employer at risk. The court found that the defendant employer had put forth significant evidence showing that the decisionmaker had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to terminate plaintiff’s employment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on all by the plaintiff’s wage payment and collection. With regard to that claim, the court held that it was unwilling to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and directed that plaintiff could bring the claim in state court if she chose. The court noted that while the record did show that co-workers may have harbored some “poor feelings” for the plaintiff, were likely unkind to plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was not the best social fit for the defendant employer, non-discrimination statutes do not codify a general code of civility. The plaintiff could not prove, based on the record, that any discrimination occurred. The court concluded that this case is a cautionary tale for “borderline” cases - instead of filing “kitchen sink” complaint, parties should take an “acute and sharpened approach,” and focus on their best arguments.
Case Law Alerts
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Grants Summary Judgment for Employer: Termination for Use of Racial Slur Upheld Under Title VII and PHRA
January 1, 2026
In his lawsuit against his employer, the plaintiff, an African American male, alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (Title VII), seemingly under the theories of race/color discrimination and retaliation, and for wrongful termination. The action was originally filed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, but the employer timely removed the case to federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff had what the court described as a frustrating but innocuous conversation with a co-worker where the plaintiff commented under his breath, using the “n-word” twice. The employee he had been talking with did not use the “n-word.” Another employee reported the plaintiff to human resources. The employer conducted an investigation, which included multiple interviews, where the plaintiff admitted that he used the “n-word” twice at work. At the conclusion of the investigation, the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment. The reason given for his termination was his use of the “n-word” at work. While the plaintiff seemed to argue that being punished for using the “n-word” trampled his Constitutional right to free speech as the basis for his wrongful termination claim, the court noted that there is no Constitutional right to be had with regard to a private employer unless the employer was effectively acting on behalf of the state. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to “shoehorn” a disparate impact theory into the case for the first time at summary judgment. The plaintiff also attempted to claim that he complained to the employer about discrimination on the basis of his own protected class at a meeting requested by the employer, but the court found that this did not rise to the level of protected activity because it was at the behest of the employer, not a response to a complaint by the plaintiff. Further, the court determined from the record that the plaintiff’s complaint at the meeting was “the very definition of a ‘general complaint of unfair treatment’ which cannot support a claim for retaliation.” The court concluded that even if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under Title VII and/or the PHRA, which he did not, the court would still have found that the employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment—namely, the plaintiff violated a neutrally applicable policy prohibiting the use of certain language deemed inappropriate for the workplace. The court emphasized that the “vast majority” of other former employees who did exactly what the plaintiff had done were punished the same way he was, and the only exceptions were of the same protected class as the plaintiff. Ultimately, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on all counts. The court reiterated that Title VII and the PHRA do not exist to remedy “harshness” in the workplace; rather, their purpose is limited in scope and “designed only to ensure employers are not discriminating in their employment decisions.”
