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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

The Third Circuit Confirms that Gallagher Does Not Eradicate All Household Exclusions

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – March 19, 2021

March 19, 2021

by Patricia A. Monahan

In William Dunleavy v Mid-Century Ins. Co., D.C. No. 2-19-cv-01304, slip op. (March 18, 2021) (non precedential), the Third Circuit found that Gallagher does not apply to allow an underinsured motorist claimant who waived underinsured coverage on his motorcycle to obtain such coverage from his automobile insurer through the back door. Plaintiff did not pay for underinsured coverage. Mid-Century did not know of and had not accepted the risk of injury of its insured riding a motorcycle that was not identified on the Mid-Century auto policy.

Plaintiffs Dunleavy and Erin Francis were operating an owned motorcycle on August 12, 2015, when they were in a collision with an automobile driven by a tortfeasor. The motorcycle was insured through Progressive. Dunleavy had rejected uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage on the Progressive motorcycle policy. Dunleavy and Francis alleged that the tortfeasors’ $50,000/$100,000 policy limits were insufficient and had been exhausted. They sought underinsured motorist coverage under their Mid-Century auto policy. The Mid-Century policy provided that underinsured motorist coverage does not apply “[T]o bodily injury sustained by you or any family member while occupying or when struck by any motor vehicle owned by you or any family member which is not insured for this coverage under any similar form...”

Mid-Century disclaimed underinsured motorist coverage because Dunleavy and Francis were occupying an owned and unlisted vehicle. The Progressive policy on the motorcycle did not provide for underinsured motorist coverage. Although Dunleavy alleged that he paid for stacked underinsured motorist benefits and did not receive them, this case has nothing to do with stacking and Gallagher does not apply because waiver of underinsured motorist coverage is at issue. Gallagher turned on and waiver of stacking under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738, which is not at all relevant.

Moreover, the Third Circuit rejected Dunleavy’s argument that Mid-Century’s knowledge of the motorcycle risk was irrelevant allegedly because premiums are set only by geographical region and the type of coverage. The court cited Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 761 (Pa. 1994), which recognized the “obvious...there is a correlation between the premiums paid by the insured and the coverage a claimant could reasonably expect to receive.”

Dunleavy underscores that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Gallagher does not eradicate all underinsured motorist exclusions.

 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – March 19, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.