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Defense Digest

Student Athlete or Employee? The Ball Is Still Up in the Air

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Alexandra O. Freeman

Key Points:

  • College athletes are not precluded from bringing FLSA claims as “employees.” 
  • Courts could find that college athletes are employees under the FLSA under the Third Circuit’s new test. 
  • Colleges could reduce or eliminate their athletic programs due to financial burden.

Following the Third Circuit’s ruling in Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2024 WL 3367646 (3d. Cir. July 11, 2024), despite their decades’ long standing as “student athletes,” Division I college athletes may now—under certain circumstances—be considered college employees and may be subject to the federal wage and hour laws. Specifically, the court in Johnson determined that Division I college athletes are not barred from bringing suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandates that “employees” receive minimum wages and non-exempt employees are paid overtime for more than 40 hours worked during a workweek. As a result, courts may find that they are considered employees under the FLSA, and, therefore, that these student athletes (numbering approximately 190,000) would be entitled to compensation in the form of minimum wages, overtime pay, and other rights for their participation in intercollegiate athletic programs. 

In 2019, Ralph Johnson and five other former and current Division I college athletes filed suit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and 13 Division I colleges (as representatives of a defendant class of all private and semi-public NCAA Division I member schools). Mr. Johnson and his fellow plaintiffs filed suit for unpaid wages under FLSA and various state wage and hours, arguing that their participation in Division I intercollegiate athletics should be compensated because they were, in fact, “employees,” as defined under the applicable laws. 

Following the filing of the lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the NCAA and the colleges moved to dismiss the claims, but the court ultimately denied the motion. The court did, however, certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the appeal. 

Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s review was to determine “whether college athletes, by nature of their so-called amateur status, are precluded from ever bringing an FLSA claim.” The Third Circuit concluded that their “answer to this question is no.” This, however, means that, while the Third Circuit did not decide whether college athletes are employees under the FLSA, colleges athletes could be considered employees. This decision is a departure from the rulings in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which in 2016 and 2019 had determined that student athletes are not able to bring suit under the FLSA. 

In so holding, the Third Circuit went through the history of intercollegiate sports, beginning with the first intercollegiate competition—a rowing competition held between Harvard and Yale in 1852. Interestingly, this competition was not proposed by either school. Rather, it was the superintendent of a railroad who suggested the race, motivated by his financial interest to increase ridership on his railroad by transporting spectators to and from the race. The financial motivation behind college athletics has only grown since its inception, with the Third Circuit noting that, today, some colleges and universities make millions of dollars in revenue from their sports teams (mainly from their football and/or basketball programs) each year. 

In concluding that college athletes may ultimately be deemed employees under the FLSA, the Third Circuit remanded the case back to the trial court with the direction to apply “an economic realities analysis grounded in common-law agency principles.” The district court had previously applied the seven-factor test from Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (determining that unpaid interns should not be classified as employees). However, in rejecting this test, the Third Circuit reasoned that “the Glatt test has limited relevance to athletes because it compares the benefits that an intern might receive at an internship with the training received at the intern’s formal education program. In comparison, interscholastic athletics are not part of any academic curriculum.” The Third Circuit, instead, fashioned a new test, deciding that “college athletes may be employees when they (a) perform services for another party, (b) ‘necessarily and primarily for the [other party’s] benefit,’ (c) under that party’s control or right of control, and (d) in return for ‘express’ or ‘implied’ compensation or ‘in-kind benefits.’” Therefore, in analyzing any of these claims, these are the elements which must be evaluated by the lower court to determine if an athlete is an employee, which will be the subject of significant discovery as the case proceeds in order to make a record for summary judgment. 

This ruling may have a huge impact on NCAA-affiliated colleges across the country, which may now find themselves defending against student athlete claims under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. In departing from the rulings of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit has potentially opened the door for new suits to be filed across the country. 

Additionally, not all sports, nor all schools, generate the million-dollar revenues mentioned by the Third Circuit. While the court references the revenue brought in by large football and basketball programs, college athletic programs consist of more than just the football and basketball programs and players. Though some schools may benefit financially from a couple of their athletic teams, the majority of sports programs cost more than they bring in. Adding the payment of wages to already existing costs of athletic programs may prove prohibitive for some, or many, schools. 

The full impact of this decision is still unclear, but, ultimately, schools may find themselves defending lawsuits, eliminating athletic scholarships, cutting less financially lucrative sports teams, or getting rid of their athletic programs entirely in order to manage their finances. 

Alex is an associate in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.