.

Alexandra O. Freeman

Portrait of Alexandra O. Freeman

Alexandra is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice in the areas of education law and employment law.

In 2022, Alex received her juris doctor from Temple University Beasley School of Law where she was a member of the Veteran Law Group and the President of the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Alex worked as an Assistant District Attorney at the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office for the Municipal Court Unit and the Economic Crimes Unit. 

Alex graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 2014 and commissioned as a Naval Officer. She served as a Surface Warfare Officer for five years. She was stationed in Japan for two years and then in Virginia for three years before departing the Navy to attend law school. 
 

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2022)
    • United States Naval Academy (B.S., 2014)
    • Pennsylvania, 2022
    • New Jersey, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • Russian (conversational)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2025-2026)

Results

Thought Leadership

The EEOC's Litigation Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

November 8, 2024

Since the law went into effect, the EEOC has reported that it has received more than 2,000 charges alleging violation of the PWFA. In addition, the EEOC has recently filed several lawsuits against employers who have allegedly violated the PWFA, which provides accommodations for pregnant, and postpartum, applicants and employees.

Defense Digest

Student Athlete or Employee? The Ball Is Still Up in the Air

September 1, 2024

Key Points: College athletes are not precluded from bringing FLSA claims as “employees.”  Courts could find that college athletes are employees under the FLSA under the Third Circuit’s new test.  Colleges could reduce or eliminate their athletic programs due to financial burden. Following the Third Circuit’s ruling in Johnson v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2024 WL 3367646 (3d. Cir. July 11, 2024), despite their decades’ long standing as “student athletes,” Division I college athletes may now—under certain circumstances—be considered college employees and may be subject to the federal wage and hour laws. Specifically, the court in Johnson determined that Division I college athletes are not barred from bringing suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandates that “employees” receive minimum wages and non-exempt employees are paid overtime for more than 40 hours worked during a workweek. As a result, courts may find that they are considered employees under the FLSA, and, therefore, that these student athletes (numbering approximately 190,000) would be entitled to compensation in the form of minimum wages, overtime pay, and other rights for their participation in intercollegiate athletic programs.  In 2019, Ralph Johnson and five other former and current Division I college athletes filed suit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and 13 Division I colleges (as representatives of a defendant class of all private and semi-public NCAA Division I member schools). Mr. Johnson and his fellow plaintiffs filed suit for unpaid wages under FLSA and various state wage and hours, arguing that their participation in Division I intercollegiate athletics should be compensated because they were, in fact, “employees,” as defined under the applicable laws.  Following the filing of the lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the NCAA and the colleges moved to dismiss the claims, but the court ultimately denied the motion. The court did, however, certify the matter for an interlocutory appeal, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the appeal.  Ultimately, the Third Circuit’s review was to determine “whether college athletes, by nature of their so-called amateur status, are precluded from ever bringing an FLSA claim.” The Third Circuit concluded that their “answer to this question is no.” This, however, means that, while the Third Circuit did not decide whether college athletes are employees under the FLSA, colleges athletes could be considered employees. This decision is a departure from the rulings in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, which in 2016 and 2019 had determined that student athletes are not able to bring suit under the FLSA.  In so holding, the Third Circuit went through the history of intercollegiate sports, beginning with the first intercollegiate competition—a rowing competition held between Harvard and Yale in 1852. Interestingly, this competition was not proposed by either school. Rather, it was the superintendent of a railroad who suggested the race, motivated by his financial interest to increase ridership on his railroad by transporting spectators to and from the race. The financial motivation behind college athletics has only grown since its inception, with the Third Circuit noting that, today, some colleges and universities make millions of dollars in revenue from their sports teams (mainly from their football and/or basketball programs) each year.  In concluding that college athletes may ultimately be deemed employees under the FLSA, the Third Circuit remanded the case back to the trial court with the direction to apply “an economic realities analysis grounded in common-law agency principles.” The district court had previously applied the seven-factor test from Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (determining that unpaid interns should not be classified as employees). However, in rejecting this test, the Third Circuit reasoned that “the Glatt test has limited relevance to athletes because it compares the benefits that an intern might receive at an internship with the training received at the intern’s formal education program. In comparison, interscholastic athletics are not part of any academic curriculum.” The Third Circuit, instead, fashioned a new test, deciding that “college athletes may be employees when they (a) perform services for another party, (b) ‘necessarily and primarily for the [other party’s] benefit,’ (c) under that party’s control or right of control, and (d) in return for ‘express’ or ‘implied’ compensation or ‘in-kind benefits.’” Therefore, in analyzing any of these claims, these are the elements which must be evaluated by the lower court to determine if an athlete is an employee, which will be the subject of significant discovery as the case proceeds in order to make a record for summary judgment.  This ruling may have a huge impact on NCAA-affiliated colleges across the country, which may now find themselves defending against student athlete claims under the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. In departing from the rulings of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit has potentially opened the door for new suits to be filed across the country.  Additionally, not all sports, nor all schools, generate the million-dollar revenues mentioned by the Third Circuit. While the court references the revenue brought in by large football and basketball programs, college athletic programs consist of more than just the football and basketball programs and players. Though some schools may benefit financially from a couple of their athletic teams, the majority of sports programs cost more than they bring in. Adding the payment of wages to already existing costs of athletic programs may prove prohibitive for some, or many, schools.  The full impact of this decision is still unclear, but, ultimately, schools may find themselves defending lawsuits, eliminating athletic scholarships, cutting less financially lucrative sports teams, or getting rid of their athletic programs entirely in order to manage their finances.  Alex is an associate in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.