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Defense Digest

Shoddy Home-Improvement Contracting? Grounds for Recovering Treble Damages and Attorneys Fees under Pennsylvania Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act and Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

June 1, 2023

by Robert A. Morton IV

Key Points:

  • Trial courts are determined to protect the individual consumer from bad-acting contractors, including with the award of treble damages and attorneys fees under the HICPA and URPCPL.
  • Home improvement contractors must ensure that they are familiar with the provisions of both HICPA and the UTPCPL and that they perform their home improvement renovations in a workmanlike manner.

As home improvement projects have sky-rocketed in Pennsylvania in the COVID and post-COVID era, thanks to the continued “work from home” model or some form thereof, so have claims against home improvement contractors under both the Pennsylvania Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act, otherwise known as HICPA, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).

HICPA arose, at least in part, out of the need to protect consumers from unscrupulous home improvement contractors. To combat the deceptive practices of such actors, HICPA places certain requirements on these contractors, including that they register with the state, and dictates the terms and provisions which must be included in a contract with a homeowner, while also precluding certain terms and provisions that would act to limit a homeowner’s right to recover against such contractors.

While the aim is to protect consumers, both HICPA’s and UTPCPL’s requirements can sometimes appear arbitrary and onerous to home improvement contractors. However, contractors must ensure compliance with the statutes, as violations of HICPA and/or UTPCPL, even for seemingly minor technical violations, can form the basis of an award of treble damages or attorneys fees. This article addresses certain scenarios under HICPA and the UTPCPL where Pennsylvania Courts have awarded treble damages or attorney fees for violations of the statutes.

Per the UTPCPL, “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce” are unlawful. 73 P.S. § 201-3. “Unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” include, under § 201-2(4)(xvi), “making repairs, improvements or replacements on tangible, real or personal property, of a nature or quality inferior to or below the standard of that agreed to in writing.” Additionally, any violation of the HICPA is deemed a violation of the UTPCPL. 73 P.S. § 517.10. 

Any person who purchases services for personal, family, or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of an unlawful act under UTPCPL may bring a private action to recover actual damages. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). Additionally, the court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. 

A trial court has broad discretion to award treble damages for any violation of the UTPCPL, including violations of the HICPA. Johnson v. Hyundai Motor America, 698 A.2d 631, 639-640 (Pa. Super. 1997). An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (Pa. 2003). The court’s discretion as to treble damages under the UTPCPL should not be closely constrained by the common-law requirements associated with the award of punitive damages. Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 898 (Pa. 2007). Nevertheless, the discretion of courts of original jurisdiction is not limitless, and awards of treble damages may be reviewed by the appellate courts for rationality. Courts of original jurisdiction should focus on the presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful conduct as to which an award of treble damages would be consistent with, and in furtherance of, the remedial purposes of the UTPCPL. 

In actions for violations for the UTPCPL, the court may award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief, costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). The trial court has discretion in awarding attorneys fees, and an appellate court will not disturb such an award unless the trial court abuses that discretion. Skurnowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 796 (Pa. Super. 2002) (superseded on other grounds). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must consider: 

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite properly to conduct the case; (2) the customary charges of the members of the bar for similar services; (3) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client or clients from the services, and (4) the contingency or certainty of the compensation.

Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 882 A.2d 1022, 1030-31 (Pa. Super. 2005).

The trial court must link the fee award to the amount of damages the plaintiff sustained under the UTPCPL and eliminate from the award of attorneys fees the efforts of counsel to recover on non-UTPCPL theories. Courts have acknowledged the difficulty of parsing out the time between UTPCPL claims and other causes of action where plaintiffs are proceeding on multiple theories of relief. See e.g. Krishnan v. Culter Group, Inc., 171 A.3d 856 (Pa. Super. 2017); Boehm v. Riversource Life Inc. Co., 117 A.3d 308 (Pa. Super. 2015).

In addition, a strict liability standard is now applied to all claims brought under the “catch-all” provision of the UTPCPL for conduct that has the potential to deceive a consumer. As a result, courts may impose an award of treble damages and attorneys fees for such a violation even without considering the state of mind of the actor.

The following summarizes a few factual scenarios that have warranted awards of treble damages or attorneys fees in UTPCPL and/or HICPA cases.

In Brandt v. Master Force Construction Corp., 236 A.3d 1112 (Pa. Super. 2020), the homeowners contracted with a home improvement contractor to replace a roof. However, the roof leaked after replacement. After the contractor claimed to have fixed the leak, the leaks persisted, and the homeowners decided to hire another contractor to actually fix the leaky roof. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ultimately upheld a trial court’s award of treble damages and attorneys fees because the court applied the Neal factors and only awarded fees and expenses for which counsel had prepared invoices and which Plaintiffs had actually paid.

In Bennett v. A.T. Masterpiece Homes at Broadsprings, LLC, 40 A.3d 145 (Pa. Super. 2012), the buyers of a newly-constructed home were guaranteed by the builders that the roof, flooring, and foundational issues would be fixed, but issues persisted after construction was completed. The trial court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs double damages, and the appellate court found such award was soundly within the discretion of the trial court based on violation of the UTPCPL. 

In Krishnan, supra, home purchasers discovered chronic water infiltration issues due to construction failures committed by the defendant home builder. The trial court awarded attorneys fees, expert fees, and related costs. All were upheld.

In short, it is apparent that trial courts are determined to protect the individual consumer from bad-acting contractors, including with the award of treble damages and attorneys fees. Appellate courts will uphold such awards absent a significant overreach by the trial court. With that in mind, home improvement contractors must ensure that they are familiar with the provisions of both HICPA and the UTPCPL and that they perform their home improvement renovations in a workmanlike manner. 


 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.