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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026

January 1, 2026

by Daniel P. McGannon

PA Supreme Court Provides Flexibility to Municipal and School Boards under the Sunshine Act with Its Ruling in Coleman v. Parkland School District

Background
A dispute arose regarding the 2021 amendments to the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act (Act 65). These amendments required agencies (including school boards and borough councils) to post meeting agendas at least 24 hours in advance of a public meeting and generally prohibited taking official action on items not listed on those pre-meeting agendas.

In October 2021, the Parkland School Board added a vote to ratify a teachers' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to its agenda during a public meeting. However, the board only learned of the contract's ratification by the union shortly before the meeting began. A resident, Jarrett Coleman, challenged the vote, arguing it violated the Sunshine Act because the CBA was not on the 24-hour posted agenda and did not meet the specific "emergency" or "de minimis" exceptions listed in the Act.

The Commonwealth Court initially ruled against the District, holding that agencies could only add items if they fell into three narrow categories: (1) emergencies, (2) matters arising 24 hours before the meeting that are de minimis, or (3) matters raised by a resident during the meeting that are de minimis. The District appealed, setting the stage for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision.

The Decision
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the School District’s victory. Justice Donohue, writing for the majority, focused on a strict plain language interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act.

The "Fourth Exception": The court held that the statute’s use of the disjunctive "or" in Section 712.1(a)—which references subsections (b), (c), (d), or (e)—indicates that there are four independent exceptions to the 24-hour notice rule.

The Court determined that Section 712.1(e), often called the "Majority Vote Clause," is a standalone exception. It allows an agency to add any matter of business to the agenda during a meeting, provided they follow specific procedural steps.

The “spirit of the law” argument was rejected by the majority, explaining that the Commonwealth Court had essentially "redrafted" the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that if the text is unambiguous, the court cannot ignore the literal interpretation of the law to pursue its perceived intent.

Takeaways
For solicitors and legal counsel representing Pennsylvania municipal bodies and school districts, the Coleman ruling provides much-needed flexibility, but requires strict procedural adherence.

The Coleman decision removes the “de minimis” requirement to Majority Votes under the Sunshine Act. Given that agencies have a majority vote to create a last-minute addition to an agenda, they no longer need to prove that it is an "emergency" or "minor" (de minimis).

However, local agencies must follow the Four-Step Procedural Mandate to lawfully add an item under the "Majority Vote" exception. Practitioners must ensure their clients: 
1.    Announce the reasons for the change publicly before the vote.
2.    Conduct a separate majority vote to amend the agenda before voting on the substance of the item.
3.    Post the amended agenda online and at the principal office by the next business day.
4.    Record the reasons and the vote clearly in the meeting minutes.

Solicitors or attorneys representing local agency clients would be wise to monitor legislation by the General Assembly in response to the Coleman decision. The Assembly may respond with further clarification to the Act in the event of potential “absurd” results cautioned by some justices and whether the “broad flexibility” offered by the Coleman decision is, in fact, what the legislature intended. 


Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.
 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.