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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

Legal Update for Special Education Law – December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Daniel P. McGannon

Pennsylvania Expands School Notification Requirements for Weapons Incidents

Last month, Governor Shapiro signed Act No. 2025-44, which amends Pennsylvania’s School Code. Specifically, the new law requires Pennsylvania schools to notify parents and educators within 24 hours when a student is found in possession of a weapon on school property, school transportation or at a school-sponsored activity. 

The Bill aims to increase transparency and school safety by requiring schools to use communications methods “likely to reach” (e.g., phone, email, SMS) parents and staff impacted by a student’s possession of a weapon. In instances where the student possesses a weapon in a school building, the District should notify only parents and staff directly involved. However, the law requires broader dissemination of a student’s weapon possession when the student possesses the weapon on a multi-building campus. In such a case, all staff and parents with students in the other on-campus buildings must be notified. The law further states that notices of student weapon possessions discovered at “school-sponsored activities” should be directed to “the appropriate population” impacted by the weapon possession. 

Importantly, Districts are not required to include personally identifiable information in their notices to parents and staff. Further, Districts must provide more detailed information to families and staff with “legitimate educational interests” in the student who possessed the weapon. 

Districts must continue to report weapon possession incidents to the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE). In addition, Districts must also continue to report weapon possessions that constitute violations of 24 P.S. § 1317.2 (Possession of weapons prohibited), 18 Pa.C.S. § 912 (Possession of weapon on school property), or any other weapon identified by District policy or local ordinance. 

As with any new legislation, there is language in Act 44 that may prove ambiguous, such as what constitutes notification “likely to reach” staff and parents. However, Pennsylvania school districts should discuss updates to their policies with their solicitors to ensure compliance with Act 44’s new requirements, review FERPA requirements with staff to ensure personally identifiable information is not disclosed to unintended parties, and review and refine notification workflows. 

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.