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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – October 2025

October 1, 2025

by Christopher J. Conrad

Federal Court Remands IDEA Case for Reconsideration of Compensatory Education

Mobley v. Laboratory Charter School, 2025 WL 2621303 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2025)

A federal district court found that a school denied a student a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the IDEA but remanded the case for further consideration of compensatory education. While the Hearing Officer had ordered the school to fund independent evaluations, he denied the parent’s request for compensatory education. On appeal, the court ruled that the Hearing Officer erred in failing to consider the “hour-for-hour” remedy, even though it was not expressly requested, and directed him to either apply that approach or provide a detailed explanation for its rejection.

The plaintiff’s child, I.W.M., attended Laboratory Charter School for 3rd grade and the first half of his 4th grade year. He was diagnosed with autism, an emotional disturbance and other health impairments. Consequently, he was identified for special education and related services under the IDEA. The parent claimed that Lab Charter denied I.W.M. a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE), contesting the results of two separate evaluations (including one by an outside provider) and alleging that the two IEPs developed for him were inadequate. 

The parent filed for due process, seeking compensatory education (premised upon a “make whole” theory), programmatic changes to the IEP, and a prospective educational placement in another educational setting at Lab Charter’s expense. 

At the hearing, Lab Charter presented witnesses who testified that I.W.M. was promptly identified as a student who required special services and that the IEPs developed for him as a result of the evaluations were appropriate and provided a FAPE. 

Following the hearing, the Due Process Hearing Officer found for the parent, in part, concluding that Lab Charter denied I.W.M. a FAPE. As a remedy, the Hearing Officer ordered Lab Charter to fund independent educational evaluations for I.W.M. However, he denied the parent’s request for compensatory education and a prospective placement. In particular, the Hearing Officer concluded the record was devoid of facts to justify either “make whole” or “hour-for-hour” relief; thus, the parent did not meet her burden to establish entitlement to compensatory education. 

The parent appealed to federal court, seeking to overturn the denial of her request for compensatory education as well as enforcement of the directive for Lab Charter to fund the evaluations. The parent and the school filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. 

On appeal, the federal district court denied Lab Charter’s motion in its entirety and granted the parent’s motion in part. The court agreed with the Hearing Officer’s finding that I.W.M. was denied a FAPE. The court also found, however, that the Hearing Officer erred in not considering the “hour-for-hour” approach to compensatory education, even though it was not specifically requested by the parent, noting: “It is not unusual for hearing officers to award ‘hour-by-hour’ compensatory education where the ‘make whole’ approach is not supported.” Mobley, 2025 WL 2621303 at *23. The court further reasoned: 

Here, the Hearing Officer has not discussed his reasons for denying ‘hour-for-hour’ compensatory education. He merely states that ‘[a]bsent facts supporting either theory, I now conclude that the Parent did not meet her burden of proof in establishing an entitlement to compensatory education relief.’ … This conclusory statement does not provide this reviewing Court with sufficient reasons why the ‘hour-for-hour’ theory of relief does not apply here.

Ibid.
    
As a result, the court remanded the case to the Hearing Officer to reconsider his conclusion to reject the “hour-for-hour” approach or to explain in more detail why this form of compensatory education was not an appropriate remedy under the circumstances. 

The court also ordered Lab Charter to pay for the evaluations as previously directed. 
     
The takeaway: Due Process Hearing Officers have broad discretion to award compensatory education if there is a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Even if the parent does not specifically request application of the “make whole” or “hour-for-hour” approach (or neither), because compensatory education is an equitable remedy, Hearing Officers may award compensatory education and apply either approach if the facts of the case warrant the relief. 


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.