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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – November 2025

November 1, 2025

by Jacob M. Gilboy

Eastern District of PA Finds that Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act Does Not Create a Stand-Alone Federal Cause of Action Based Upon Denial of Educational Records
Sandra S. v. Upper Darby Sch. Dist., No. CV 25-2389, 2025 WL 2724380, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2025)

The parents of a 12-year-old autistic student requested his educational records from the Upper Darby School District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The District allegedly provided some of the student’s educational records, but not all. The parents then filed a due process complaint, alleging failures under both IDEA and Section 504, including a failure to provide records. 

The specific question before the court was “whether one or both statutes [IDEA and Section 504] give parents a stand-alone private right of action when a school fails to provide educational records.” The Eastern District Court concluded that the IDEA creates a private cause of action in federal court for violations arising out of the denial of access to educational records, but that Section 504 does not.

The court noted that the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “work in tandem to provide students with disabilities with the right to a free appropriate public education and to receive accommodations in education,” including providing parents an entitlement to receive certain educational records and undergo an administrative complaint process. However, the court explained that there are subtle differences in the statute’s structures. Where the IDEA explicitly grants parents the right to “examine all records” relating to identification, evaluation, placement or FAPE, parents may file a complaint with respect to any matter relating to these issues. Under the IDEA, procedural violations are actionable if they impede FAPE, significantly restrict parent participation or result in loss of educational benefit. Thus, denial of records is a procedural violation that may impair parents’ participation.

While Section 504 does broadly allow private enforcement, not every regulation under this statute is privately actionable. The regulation requiring a records-access procedure is institutional in nature (focused on systems schools must implement), not a direct individual right. Therefore, no private federal cause of action exists solely for record-access violations under Section 504.

The court opined: 

The regulation at issue is directed towards a regulated entity—’a recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program’—rather than protected individuals. It requires such institutions to establish and implement ... a system of procedural safeguards, thus focusing on the creation of institutional procedures rather than the personal rights of individuals. And though one mandated procedural safeguard is ‘an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine relevant records,’ the regulation is focused on the broader processes that funding recipients must establish. (Internal citations omitted). 
Accordingly, the Section 504 claim could not proceed.

It must be noted, however, that the dispositive question was whether a private cause of action exists in a federal court, not whether there is a right to file an administrative complaint. 


Legal Update for Special Education Law – November 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.