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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – September 2024

September 1, 2024

by Christopher J. Conrad

Third Circuit affirmed lower court, concluding school district’s re-evaluation was appropriate, its diagnosis of autism was supported, and school district’s proposed IEP was an offer of a FAPE.

Ruari C. by and through Ronan C. v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 3633700 (3rd Cir. Aug. 2, 2024)

The school district re-evaluated the student during the 2021–22 school year and concluded the student was eligible to receive IDEA services based upon a primary disability category of autism. The student was also identified as gifted. The school district proposed an IEP that included, among other things, social skills every other day in an autistic support classroom. The parents rejected the proposed IEP, arguing, in part, that the school district incorrectly identified the student with autism. The parents also notified the school district that they intended to place the student in a private parochial school at public expense.

The parents filed a due process complaint under the IDEA and § 504, alleging the school district denied the student a FAPE, and they sought tuition reimbursement for the private school placement. The due process hearing officer found the school district made an offer of a FAPE and denied the parents’ request for tuition reimbursement. The parents appealed to federal District Court, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. The District Court, in part, reasoned that the school district’s diagnosis of the student with autism was “multifactorial” and consistent with the record evidence.

The parents appealed again to the Third Circuit, which affirmed, concluding the school district’s re-evaluation was appropriate, that its diagnosis of the student with autism was supported, and that the school district’s proposed IEP was an offer of a FAPE:

The District Court did not legally or factually err when it concluded that Ruari has autism because his evaluation was based on multiple assessments that were technically sound and indicated that he exhibits characteristics of autism. Moreover, even if we thought there was a basis for saying that the diagnosis of autism was not adequately supported by the record, we would still affirm the conclusion that Ruari was offered a FAPE. The Family contends that the IEP did not provide him with an education in the least restrictive environment by requiring that he spend ninety minutes every other day in the autistic support classroom. Because “the proposed IEP would have provided Ruari with a meaningful educational benefit,” the Family’s claim fails.


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – September 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.