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Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2025

January 1, 2025

by Christopher J. Conrad

Due to the situation-specific nature of parental involvement in educational decisions, nonparticipation in one decision due to a procedural inadequacy is not automatically a major barrier to a parent’s input in the overall decision-making process.
J.L. by and through Holly M. v. East Stroudsburg Area School District, 2024 WL 4763868 (3rd Cir. Nov. 13, 2024)

J.L., an IDEA-eligible fifteen-year-old student with autism spectrum disorder, ADHD and a specific learning disability in listening comprehension, brought a three-inch pocketknife to school. As a consequence, J.L. was suspended out of school for 45 days, and he was placed in a cyber program for the remainder of the school year. The suspension carried over into the next school year, and he started the school year at Colonial Academy, an intermediate unit program. Before the 45-day suspension expired, the high school principal met with J.L.’s grandfather, one of his legal guardians, and they agreed that J.L. would remain at Colonial Academy through the end of the first quarter in order to avoid disruption to J.L.’s academics and routine. J.L.’s grandmother, his other legal guardian, was not provided notice of the meeting with the principal, nor was she given an opportunity to weigh in on the decision to continue J.L.’s suspension and placement at Colonial Academy.

At the beginning of the second quarter, J.L. returned to East Stroudsburg High School South. Three weeks into the school year, J.L. threatened to kill another student, and he was expelled from school for one school year. Both grandparents filed an expedited due process complaint, challenging the expulsion, as well as the decision to extend J.L.’s placement/suspension at Colonial Academy. The grandparents claimed the alleged IDEA procedural violation (i.e., the decision to continue the Colonial Academy placement without notice to or input from J.L.’s grandmother) resulted in a substantive denial of a FAPE.

The Hearing Officer rejected the denial of FAPE claims. In particular, the Hearing Officer concluded the lack of notice to J.L.’s grandmother of the decision to extend his placement/ suspension at Colonial Academy did not seriously deprive her of her right to participation in the decision-making process concerning J.L.’s education. The Hearing Officer noted the grandmother had met with J.L.’s IEP team twice and approved both J.L.’s initial placement in the cyber program and his subsequent transfer to Colonial Academy at the beginning of the school year. The grandmother also participated in a third meeting at which she agreed with the decision to return J.L. to the high school.

The grandmother appealed the Hearing Officer’s decision to federal district court, which upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision. The district court reasoned the decision to continue J.L.’s placement at Colonial Academy for 16 days did not amount to a change in placement requiring notice and a hearing. Also, the district court agreed with the Hearing Officer that the decision to extend the placement/suspension did not seriously impede the grandmother’s participation in J.L.’s education.

On further appeal, the 3rd Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. In reaching its conclusion, the 3rd Circuit reasoned:

Because of the circumstance-specific nature of parental involvement in educational decisions, a parent’s nonparticipation in one decision due to a procedural inadequacy is not automatically a significant impediment to that parent’s participation in the overall decision-making process…the District Court correctly held that on these facts [of this case], in which the grandfather as guardian consented to the extension and the grandmother as guardian was otherwise involved in the decision-making process, the grandmother was not significantly impeded from participating in the decision-making process such that J.L. was denied a FAPE. 
 


 

Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

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