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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Fourth District Court of Appeal recedes from prior case law and finds a motion or request for trial de novo must be made within 20 days of an adverse arbitration decision, or trial is waived.

Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. d/b/a Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and Heart Institute and Patrick Regan, D.O. v. Gwendolyn Rouse, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Marleana Rouse, et al., Fla. 4th DCA, July 3, 2024, Case No. 4D2022-2637

August 1, 2024

by Danielle N. Robinson

The plaintiff filed suit against several physicians and two hospitals, including Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc., for medical negligence after a family member’s death during a hospitalization. The circuit court ordered the parties to nonbinding arbitration, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 44.103. In May 2022, the arbitrator rendered a decision, finding two of Lawnwood’s physicians liable and Lawnwood vicariously liable for the physicians’ negligence. The arbiter also found the personal representative was entitled to $6,534,700 in damages. 

One of the physicians and his employer timely filed a motion for a trial de novo under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.820(h), and the plaintiff timely filed two motions for trial de novo regarding the physician not found to be liable. However, Lawnwood and the other physician found liable did not file a motion for trial de novo until 22 days after the arbitration decision was rendered, which was two days after the 20-day deadline. Because the motion was untimely, the plaintiff moved for final judgement against Lawnwood and that physician. In response, Lawnwood argued, among other things, that Lawnwood substantially complied with rule 1.820(h)’s 20-day deadline because its counsel took steps toward trial within the 20 days, despite not timely filing the motion. The court granted the motion for final judgment, and an appeal followed. 

The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court’s granting of the motion for final judgment, receding from Nicholson-Kenny Capital Management, Inc. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d. 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), finding it had been wrongfully decided. Nicholson-Kenny deviated from the longstanding rule of non-discretionary enforcement of section 44.103(5), creating a discretionary analysis of whether “some notice” was provided to the opposing party that the party was rejecting an arbitration award. If there was evidence of “some notice” within 20 days, the actual filing of a request or motion for a trial de novo within the 20 days was not required. 

The court found Nicholson-Kenny conflicted with section 44.103(5) and rule 1.820(h), as both the statute and the rule contain mandatory language requiring a party to file a request for trial de novo within 20 days. The court found that any reasonable person interpreting the statute and the rule would understand there is a requirement to file a request for trial de novo or a motion for trial within 20 days of service of an arbitrator’s adverse decision. Finally, the court noted this hardline rule actually got rid of the “gotcha” tactics they were trying to limit with the Nicholson-Kenny decision, because now there is no question as to whether a request or motion for a trial de novo is required. 

The court ruled that if any party wants to move forward with trial after an adverse arbitration decision, it must file a request or motion for a trial de novo within 20 days of an adverse arbitration decision, or it is waived. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – August 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.