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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3)’s apportionment requirement found inapplicable by virtue of Rule 1,442(c)(4) as the complaint explicitly alleged the co-defendant was only constructively liable for its alleged breach of the purchase agreement.

Webjet Linhas Aereas S.A. etc., et al. v. ZGA Aircraft Leasing, Inc., 49 Fla. Weekly D620a (Fla. 3rd DCA 2024)

May 1, 2024

by Carolin A. Pacheco

On March 20, 2024, the Third District Court of Appeal rendered a decision concerning the characterization of a “joint proposal” for settlement governed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). The court found that the rule’s apportionment requirement was rendered inapplicable by virtue of Rule 1.442(c)(4) because the plaintiff’s operative complaint explicitly alleged that the co-defendant was only constructively liable for its co-defendant’s alleged breach of the purchase agreement. 

This case involved a breach of purchase agreement claim where the plaintiff, ZGA Aircraft Leasing, Inc., a low-cost economy airline, sought to determine the validity and enforceability of its purchase agreement with Webjet Linhas Aereas S.A., another low-cost economy airline, to buy six aircraft in 2013. Within its complaint, the plaintiff sought to impose liability and to pierce the corporate veil as to Webjet’s parent company, GOL Linhas Aeres, S.A., claiming in its operative complaint that it was “constructively liable” for the plaintiff’s alleged damages.

The co-defendants served the plaintiff with its joint proposal for settlement in the amount of $75,000 in complete settlement of all claims made by the plaintiff against Webjet. Ultimately, the case went to trial. The trial court entered final judgement, ruling in favor of the co-defendant, who proceeded to file a timely motion for attorney’s fees and costs per Rule 1.442 and § 768.79, Florida Statutes. At the motion hearing, the trial court erroneously determined that the proposal for settlement did not strictly comply with the requirement of Rule 1.442 as it failed to apportion the amount offered between the co-defendants. 

The appellate court found that, while the lower court correctly determined it was a joint proposal for settlement, it failed to consider the exception in Rule 1.442(c)(4) which states apportionment is not applicable “when a party is alleged to be solely vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable.” The plaintiff’s operational complaint explicitly claimed constructive liability against GOL Linhas Aeres; thus, apportionment was unnecessary per the rule.

In this decision, the Third District Court of Appeals affirms that Rule 1.442’s apportionment requirement does not matter to the offeree when one of the defendants is being sued solely for constructive liability. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – May 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

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