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Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Holds Right to Arbitrate Did Not Apply Within Lien Transfer Bond

Andersen Service Corporation v. Old Republic Surety Company, 2026 WL 61436 (Fla.App. 4 Dist., 2026)

April 1, 2026

by Kristen A. Hobkirk

A trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration was recently overturned after the Fourth District Court of Appeals determined that no enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties.

The plaintiff, Andersen Service Company, entered into a subcontract with Marco Contractors, Inc. for construction work, which included a dispute resolution clause enabling only Marco to select arbitration or litigation. If Marco elected arbitration, that proceeding would have to take place in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

Subsequently, Andersen filed a construction lien for unpaid work. That lien was transferred to a lien transfer bond, issued by the defendant, Old Republic Surety Company. Notably, the transfer did not incorporate the subcontract and its arbitration clause, but rather indicated it was issued pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 713.24. Thereafter, Andersen filed suit in Broward County where the bond was recorded, and Old Republic Surety sought to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Old Republic’s Motion, and proceedings were subsequently stayed.

On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court granted the motion in error, as there was no binding contract compelling the arbitration between Andersen and Old Republic. Only Marco Contractors and Andersen were parties to the contract, not Old Republic. The court held that sureties cannot exercise the contractual election right when that right is saved for the principal to the contract. Marco Construction exclusively retained the right to elect arbitration, and the bond transfer did not enable Old Republic to do so. As a result, the Fourth DCA remanded to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to its ruling.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.