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Kristen A. Hobkirk

Associate

KAHobkirk@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Kristen A. Ballard

Kristen is an associate in the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of architects, engineers, owners, developers, general contractors, construction managers, subcontractors and design professionals. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey as an associate, she previously served as a summer law clerk at our firm.

Kristen received her juris doctor, magna cum laude, with a concentration in advocacy from Stetson University College of Law. While at Stetson, Kristen was very active in university organizations and activities. She was a team member for both the Mock Trial Team and Dispute Resolution Board and won National Championships with both boards. She served as a teaching assistant for Evidence and Insurance Law and a research assistant to Professor Elizabeth Boals. She was also an associate for both Stetson Law Review & Business Law Review and was named Outstanding New Associate for Stetson Law Review. Further, Kristen was awarded the E. Harris Drew Memorial Award, Victor O. Whele Award in Trial Advocacy and inducted into the National Order of the Barristers. Outside of class, Kristen volunteered her time with the Bay Area Legal Services Family Forms Clinic & Pinellas County Teen Court.

In her spare time, Kristen enjoys going to yoga classes, spending time with her family, and attending concerts.

    • Stetson University College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2025)
    • University of North Florida (B.A., summa cum laude, 2020)
    • Florida, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2026
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2026
    • National Order of the Barristers (2025)

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Florida’s Fourth District Affirms Language and Punctuation Must Govern Interpretation of Contracts

November 3, 2026

Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently issued a stark reminder that Contractors must use precision in the drafting of language in operative contract and subcontracts. Without the proper precision, when the court is confined to interpretation of the plain language and punctuation, a contractor may find its own agreement used against it. In Treasure Coast, the Court was tasked with interpreting an agreement between two parties, Treasure Coast Classical Academy & Optima Foundation, who had contracted together for services at the school. Crucially the Contract included the following forum selection clause: State Governing Law/Venue/Waiver of Jury Trial. The rights of all parties hereto shall be subject to the jurisdiction of and be construed according to the laws of the State of Florida, with venue in Collier County, Florida. The claims were filed in Martin County, and Optima sought to enforce the contract between the two as a mandatory clause requiring dispute resolution in Collier County. The Trial Court agreed, and the Academy appealed. In interpreting Global Commercial Roofing, LLC v. iCrete, LLC, 410 So. 3d 735, 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), a construction law decision, the Court affirmed that “shall” only applies to the Florida Law section, not the language set off by the comma. Therefore, the Fourth District held that the provision of “venue in Collier, County, Florida” was permissive and not a mandatory condition of litigation. This ruling should serve as a reminder to General Contractors and Subcontractors alike to confirm the language within any venue selection provision contained within its Contract.

Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Holds Right to Arbitrate Did Not Apply Within Lien Transfer Bond

April 1, 2026

A trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration was recently overturned after the Fourth District Court of Appeals determined that no enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties. The plaintiff, Andersen Service Company, entered into a subcontract with Marco Contractors, Inc. for construction work, which included a dispute resolution clause enabling only Marco to select arbitration or litigation. If Marco elected arbitration, that proceeding would have to take place in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Subsequently, Andersen filed a construction lien for unpaid work. That lien was transferred to a lien transfer bond, issued by the defendant, Old Republic Surety Company. Notably, the transfer did not incorporate the subcontract and its arbitration clause, but rather indicated it was issued pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 713.24. Thereafter, Andersen filed suit in Broward County where the bond was recorded, and Old Republic Surety sought to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Old Republic’s Motion, and proceedings were subsequently stayed. On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court granted the motion in error, as there was no binding contract compelling the arbitration between Andersen and Old Republic. Only Marco Contractors and Andersen were parties to the contract, not Old Republic. The court held that sureties cannot exercise the contractual election right when that right is saved for the principal to the contract. Marco Construction exclusively retained the right to elect arbitration, and the bond transfer did not enable Old Republic to do so. As a result, the Fourth DCA remanded to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to its ruling.

Firm Highlights

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law

News

Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed.