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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

First District Court of Appeal finds setoff is appropriate in an underinsured motorist claim when the tortfeasor’s liability coverage is available to an injured plaintiff, even when no benefits have been paid.

Richard Hale v. GEICO General Insurance Company, Fla. 1st DCA, 1D2022-3389, June 5, 2024

July 1, 2024

by Danielle N. Robinson

The plaintiff had been involved in a vehicle accident and pursued a claim with the tortfeasor motorist’s liability insurance, with limits of $25,000.00, but later abandoned the claim. Afterwards, the plaintiff pursued an underinsured motorist claim with his insurance company, GEICO.

The claim proceeded to trial, where the plaintiff argued the other motorist was underinsured he was entitled to damages. The jury determined the motorist was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages and awarded the plaintiff $17,000.00, entering final judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. GEICO moved to setoff the verdict by the motorist’s $25,000.00 policy limits, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 627.727, and moved to amend the final judgment to find in favor of GEICO. 

The trial court found that under Fla. Stat. § 627.727, an underinsured motorist carrier is entitled to a setoff in the amount of benefits available to its insured under the underinsured’s liability policy. Therefore, because the motorist had coverage in the amount of $25,000.00 available to the plaintiff at the time of the accident, GEICO was entitled to a setoff and judgment in its favor. 

On appeal, the plaintiff argued GEICO did not properly raise setoff as an affirmative defense and that GEICO failed to demonstrate the funds from the motorist’s policy were “available.” The court found that under Fla. Stat. § 627.727(6)(c), the carrier is “entitled to a credit against total damages in the amount of the limits of the underinsured motorist’s liability policy.” The court found the statute does not require the carrier to plead setoff as an affirmative defense and that GEICO properly asserted its right to setoff in a post-trial motion. Therefore, GEICO was entitled to the setoff. 

Additionally, the court found that a tortfeaser’s liability coverage is “available” to an injured insured even when no proceedings have been commenced and no benefits have actually been paid. Therefore, the court found that, in this case, the motorist’s insurance benefits were “available” to the plaintiff, even though he abandoned his claim for benefits and never received them. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings in favor of GEICO. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.