Professional Liability

In his lawsuit against his employer, the plaintiff, an African American male, alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (Title VII), seemingly under the theories of race/color discrimination and retaliation, and for wrongful termination. The action was originally filed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, but the employer timely removed the case to federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

The plaintiff had what the court described as a frustrating but innocuous conversation with a co-worker where the plaintiff commented under his breath, using the “n-word” twice. The employee he had been talking with did not use the “n-word.” Another employee reported the plaintiff to human resources.

The employer conducted an investigation, which included multiple interviews, where the plaintiff admitted that he used the “n-word” twice at work. At the conclusion of the investigation, the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment. The reason given for his termination was his use of the “n-word” at work.

While the plaintiff seemed to argue that being punished for using the “n-word” trampled his Constitutional right to free speech as the basis for his wrongful termination claim, the court noted that there is no Constitutional right to be had with regard to a private employer unless the employer was effectively acting on behalf of the state. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to “shoehorn” a disparate impact theory into the case for the first time at summary judgment.

The plaintiff also attempted to claim that he complained to the employer about discrimination on the basis of his own protected class at a meeting requested by the employer, but the court found that this did not rise to the level of protected activity because it was at the behest of the employer, not a response to a complaint by the plaintiff. Further, the court determined from the record that the plaintiff’s complaint at the meeting was “the very definition of a ‘general complaint of unfair treatment’ which cannot support a claim for retaliation.”

The court concluded that even if the plaintiff had established a prima facie case under Title VII and/or the PHRA, which he did not, the court would still have found that the employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment—namely, the plaintiff violated a neutrally applicable policy prohibiting the use of certain language deemed inappropriate for the workplace. The court emphasized that the “vast majority” of other former employees who did exactly what the plaintiff had done were punished the same way he was, and the only exceptions were of the same protected class as the plaintiff.

Ultimately, the court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer on all counts. The court reiterated that Title VII and the PHRA do not exist to remedy “harshness” in the workplace; rather, their purpose is limited in scope and “designed only to ensure employers are not discriminating in their employment decisions.”