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Case Law Alerts

Does a Municipality Have Statutory Duty to Indemnify Its Police Officer for Judgment Entered Against Him in Federal Civil Rights Lawsuit?

McGuire on behalf of Neidig v. City of Pittsburgh, 285 A.3d 887 (Pa. 2022)

October 1, 2024

by Jordan L. Mazzoni

In late 2012, 16-year-old Shane McGuire and friends smashed pumpkins and stacked bricks on the doorstep of the home of City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Colby Neidig. Once Neidig and his family arrived home, McGuire watched the family’s reaction to the vandalism and then banged on the front door and ran away, accidentally tripping over his own brick booby trap in the process. Neidig heard the ruckus and gave chase. Neidig caught McGuire, knocked him to the ground and punched him in the face. Neidig was not wearing his police uniform, nor did he identify himself as a police officer. Neidig called 911 and restrained McGuire until Officer David Blatt, an on-duty City of Pittsburg police officer, arrived. 

McGuire filed a federal lawsuit against Neidig, Blatt and the City of Pittsburgh, asserting excessive use of force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and claiming Neidig was liable for McGuire’s assault and battery claims. Blatt and the City were dismissed at the summary judgment stage, and the claims against Neidig proceeded to a jury trial. 

The jury returned a verdict for McGuire for all three claims, and the court awarded him damages for said claims in the amount of $235,575. Neidig assigned McGuire his right to sue the City for indemnification under the PSTCA. 

McGuire then sued the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that the City was statutorily obligated to indemnify Neidig under Subsection 8548(a) of the PSTCA, which went to a jury trial. The jury concluded Neidig was not acting within the scope of his duties when he assaulted McGuire, meaning the City was not required to indemnify Neidig under the PSTCA.

McGuire appealed that decision to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. McGuire then petitioned for allowance of appeal, arguing that a federal jury’s finding that a police officer acted “under color of state law” for purposes of Section 1983 constitutes and is synonymous with a “judicial determination” that the officer acted within the “scope of his office or duties” under the PSTCA. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania analyzed that a police officer may sometimes act both “under the color of state law” and beyond the scope of his or her employment. 

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ultimately held that the Restatement (Second) of Agency section setting forth the “scope of employment” test would be adopted to determine if a public employee’s conduct falls within “scope of office or duties” under indemnity provisions of the PSTCA. Further, a determination that an officer acted “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983 does not establish that he acted “within the scope of his office or employment” for purposes of the PSTCA. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.