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Defense Digest

Assignment of Benefits Contractor Precluded from Recovery Pursuant to Mortgagee Clause

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

June 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • The buyer of a home was not considered a mortgagee under a homeowners insurance policy when the proceeds from the sale were used to pay off the mortgage but there was no evidence that the buyer assumed any legal rights under the mortgage. 
  • Assuming the buyer was a mortgagee, he had no rights to recover under the homeowners policy’s mortgage clause because the mortgage was satisfied. 

Sometimes non-insured individuals and entities concoct creative ways to recover payments under homeowners insurance policies to which they are not a party. For example, one avenue is to obtain an assignment of benefits (AOB) from the insured after a loss occurs. However, if this avenue is closed, for example, due to a denial of coverage based on the actions or inactions of the insured, inventive non-insureds may pursue another avenue to recover insurance benefits—as illustrated in the case of Williams v. Nationwide Insurance, 2023 WL 2632212 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2023).

In Williams, Thomas P. Williams, Sr., the owner of a contracting company, filed a declaratory judgment action against Nationwide Insurance seeking a declaration that the insurer was required to pay him the insurance proceeds for a loss to the insured property. Judge Edward G. Smith, however, granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer and denied Williams’ artful attempt to secure insurance proceeds under the policy. 

Mark and Elizabeth Ann Ruch had purchased a homeowners policy with Nationwide Insurance. A fire destroyed their home on June 18, 2020. The Ruchs filed a claim with Nationwide, which ultimately denied their claim for, among other reasons, their failure to comply with the policy’s duties after loss conditions. 

Three days after the loss, Williams procured an AOB of the proceeds of the policy from the Ruchs. A few months later, Williams purchased the property from the Ruchs for $155,000. At the time, the home had a mortgage with PNC for approximately $135,000. The Ruchs satisfied the mortgage with the proceeds from the sale of the property to Williams.

Williams and the Ruchs revoked the AOB after Nationwide denied coverage for the claim, presumably because the denial would also foreclose Williams’ ability to recover under the policy as he stood in the shoes of the Ruchs based on the AOB. Williams, therefore, attempted a different avenue to recover insurance proceeds from Nationwide, arguing he was a mortgagee entitled to payment under the policy’s mortgagee clause. 

The Nationwide policy contained a standard mortgagee clause, which stated: “[i]f a mortgagee is named in the policy, any loss payable under [the policy] will be paid to the mortgagee and [the named insured].” The clause further stipulated, in part, that if the claim is denied, “the denial will not apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee,” provided certain conditions are met. 

Williams argued that he was entitled to the policy benefits under the mortgagee clause on the basis that his payment to the Ruchs to purchase the home was directly used by the Ruchs to pay off the mortgage and, therefore, Williams maintained that he became a mortgagee by standing in the shoes of PNC. In opposition, Nationwide argued that Williams merely purchased the home, thereby stepping into the shoes of the insureds as homeowners, and Williams assumed the same rights as the Ruchs. 

The court first analyzed whether Williams’ interest in the home was as a purchaser/homeowner or a mortgagee. The court held that, although the “sale proceeds were used to pay the mortgage, this [did] not give the buyer (Williams) any legal standing with respect to the mortgage.” The court noted that PNC did not assign the mortgage to Williams. Further, all the documentation, such as the settlement documents and the homeowners policy, did not identify Williams as a lender or mortgagee. The court held that Williams was a purchaser of the property and the simple fact that the sale proceeds were used to satisfy the mortgage did not transform Williams from a purchaser to a mortgagee. 

The distinction was important in this case because the mortgagee clause contained in Nationwide’s policy was a standard mortgagee clause. A standard mortgagee clause protects the mortgagee’s interest, even in some circumstances when the insurer denies the insured’s claim. 

Although the answer to the first question was dispositive of the case, the court next analyzed whether Williams (assuming he was a mortgagee) would be entitled to payment under the mortgagee clause. The court noted that the standard mortgagee clause essentially creates two contracts with Nationwide: the first with the insureds to provide benefits for covered losses; and the second with the mortgagee to pay to protect the mortgagee’s interest. The court noted that mortgagee clauses only allow the mortgagee to recover the amount of any outstanding mortgage and “no more[,]” and, to allow otherwise, would result in unjust enrichment. The mortgage was fully satisfied by the Ruchs from the proceeds of the sale of the home. Accordingly, the court ruled that, even if Williams was a mortgagee, he could not seek further payment under the policy. 

There has been an uptick is claims filed by individuals, mitigation companies, and contractors attempting to secure payments under homeowners policies on which they are not insureds. This trend has largely hinged on obtaining AOBs from the insureds. The Williams case shows that the AOB avenue is not the only option available to these non-insured individuals or entities. They may attempt to secure benefits through the mortgagee clause. However, insurers need to carefully analyze whether the non-insured person or entity seeking benefits is actually a mortgagee and whether the original mortgage has been satisfied post loss.



 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.