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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Appellate Court Finds Term “Occurrence” Ambiguous as It Pertains to Parkland Mass Shooting

Sheriff of Broward County v. Evanston Insurance Company, U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, No. 24-13317, Nov. 10, 2025

December 1, 2025

by Michael A. Packer

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was recently tasked with determining whether the mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL constituted a single occurrence or multiple occurrences pursuant to a commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued to the Sheriff of Broward County. This was particularly significant as the insurance policy provided coverage only after a $500,000 self-insured retention (SIR) and a $500,000 deductible were paid by the insured. If the mass shooting constituted multiple occurrences, the insured would have been required to satisfy the $500,000 SIR for each claim before the insurer would be obligated to pay any covered damages. The CGL policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition.”

While the insurance company relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Koikos v. Travelers Insurance Co., 849 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2003) for its argument that the Parkland mass shooting constituted multiple occurrences, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insured and found the policy’s definition of “occurrence” to be ambiguous. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit explained that any ambiguity in an insurance policy is to be construed in favor of the insured. As such, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that the Parkland mass shooting was a single occurrence for the purposes of the CGL policy issued by Evanston. While the Supreme Court in Koikos decided that a restaurant shooting in which two patrons were struck by two separate gunshots were two separate occurrences, it did so only as a result of finding the term “occurrence” to be ambiguous. 

Despite the fact that the ruling in Koikos resulted in a finding of multiple occurrences and the ruling in this matter found the mass shooting to be a single occurrence, the decisions do not conflict. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Florida Supreme Court’s Koikos decision as it found the almost identical definition of the term “occurrence” to be ambiguous and, therefore, construed in favor of the insured. In the Koikos case, construing the ambiguity in favor of the insured resulted in the outcome being multiple occurrences. In the present case, construing the ambiguity in favor of the insured resulted in the outcome being a single occurrence. 


Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – December 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.