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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Addition of a definition for the term “structural damage” to Section 627.706(2) does not alter an insured’s burden of proof.

Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Barberan, Fla. 2nd DCA, 2D22-2744, Apr. 3, 2024

June 1, 2024

In April, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a statutory change, which added a definition for the term “structural damage” to a particular statute governing insurance coverage for sinkhole losses (Florida Statute § 627.706), did not alter an insureds’ burden of proof to establish that sinkhole damage to their home occurred during the period when the property had insurance coverage.

Citizens Property Insurance appealed the lower court’s ruling after final judgment was entered in favor of the homeowners in their breach of insurance contract claim related to sinkhole damage to their property. Part of Citizens’ argument was that the trial court erred in the instructions given to the jury regarding each party’s burden of proof. In support of its argument, Citizens relied primarily on a statutory change that was in effect during the policy period. The statutory change added a definition for the term “structural damage” and specified what would constitute such damage. (F.S. § 627.706(2)(k)). Citizens argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the homeowners had to prove “structural damage” to their property, not just generalized property damage. The homeowners, instead, argued that the statutory change did not alter the burden of proof and that the trial court’s instruction was fully consistent with the applicable law.

The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court’s ruling in favor of the homeowners. They agreed that the addition of a definition for the term “structural damage” to section 627.706(2) did not alter an insured’s burden of proof. Citing the lower court’s ruling, the appellate court stated that under the homeowners’ “all-risk” policy of insurance, an insured has the initial burden of proof to establish that the damage at issue occurred during a period in which the damaged property had insurance coverage and that, once an insured meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the insurance carrier to show that the loss resulted from an excluded cause. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the homeowners were not specifically required to prove structural damage to meet their burden and that the lower court’s jury instructions were in accordance with Florida law. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.