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Case Law Alerts

A Neck-Hold Is Not Clearly-Established Excessive Force

Moore v. Oakland County, Michigan, 126 F.4th 1163 (6th Cir. 2025)

April 1, 2025

by Jillian L. Dinehart

This § 1983 lawsuit was filed against a police officer after a confrontation during a traffic stop in which the plaintiff resisted compliance. Despite the district court denying the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision, ruling that the officer did not violate any clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that while excessive force cannot be used on non-violent suspects, the level of force applied in this case, including grabbing the plaintiff’s arm and holding her head down briefly, did not meet the threshold for excessive force.

The plaintiff was stopped by Officer Wilson for speeding. She refused to show her ID and moved her hands to the center console where the officer could not see them. In response, Officer Wilson ordered her out of the vehicle, then tried to open the driver’s side door, which was locked. Officer Wilson reached through the window to grab the plaintiff’s arm and ordered her to shut the car off. The plaintiff leaned away from the officer and refused to turn off the car. Officer Wilson opened the door from the inside then grabbed the plaintiff’s arm, and she tried to twist away from him. Officer Wilson called for back-up but pulled the plaintiff’s arm out of the car with one hand and held her neck down with the other. The plaintiff continued to struggle. Backup officers arrived, and the plaintiff was taken into custody. Eventually, all charged were dropped against the plaintiff. 

The incident resulted in a § 1983 lawsuit against Officer Wilson. The district court denied Officer Wilson’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that a jury could determine he violated the plaintiff’s well-established Fourth Amendment rights.

In reviewing qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit found that in this matter, the officer did not violate a clearly established right. The court cited to the principle that an officer may not subdue a non-violent, non-resisting or only passively resisting suspect with physical force, such as Tasing, pepper-spraying or beating them. In contrast, the court also considered that if an arrestee kicks, flails and wriggles away from an arresting officer’s grasp, then the officer may use a Taser to restrain him. 

In finding that it was not clearly established that Officer Wilson used excessive force in grabbing the plaintiff’s arm and holding her head down for two minutes, the court found that this force is much less than those cases that permit the use of Tasing. Nor did the court find that these holds would have been excessive force had there been aligned case law that clearly established the right. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.