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Defense Digest

A Double Take: Workers’ Compensation Liens Render UIM Non-Duplication Clauses Unenforceable

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Joshua D. Scheets

Key Points:

  • Delaware Superior Court permits injured plaintiffs-employees to board medical bills and lost wages already paid by the workers’ compensation carrier in subsequent UIM claim related to the same incident, despite a non-duplication clause in UIM policy. 
  • In John Henry, et al. v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., C.A. No. N18C-03-092 (December 23, 2024) (Brennan, J.), the court resolved seeming conflict of public policies between those underlying subrogation rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act and those behind the Uninsured Motorist Statute.

In a departure from historical precedent, the Delaware Superior Court permits injured plaintiffs-employees to board medical bills and lost wages that were already paid by the workers’ compensation carrier in a subsequent underinsured motorist (UIM) claim related to the same incident, despite the inclusion of a non-duplication clause in the UIM policy. John Henry, et al. v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., C.A. No. N18C-03-092 (December 23, 2024) (Brennan, J.) (Henry III). In so doing, the court resolves the seeming conflict of public policies between those underlying subrogation rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) and those behind the Uninsured Motorist Statute. 

Even though it may appear there is a duplicate recovery by the plaintiff-employee recovering these damages in a workers’ compensation claim and then boarding them in a subsequent UIM claim, functionally there is no duplication of damages since the recovery in the UIM context is now subject to a statutory right to subrogation of those recovered amounts by the workers’ compensation carrier/employer. The new paradigm created is best described as one in which the injured plaintiff-employee is permitted access to an advanced payment by the tortfeasor, but through the workers’ compensation carrier, with the ability to put on a full damages case against the employer’s UIM carrier where the third-party tortfeasor’s coverage in insufficient. Under the court’s rationale, by permitting this new category of damages in the UIM claim, Delaware law puts the workers’ compensation carrier or the employer as whole as reasonably can be accomplished while still fully compensating the injured plaintiff-employee.

The Henry III case involves an employee who was seriously injured in an automobile crash and then collected significant workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff-employee then filed third-party claims against the tortfeasors and collected the relatively modest policy limits and reimbursed the workers’ compensation carrier with a portion of those proceeds. The employee next filed a claim with his employer’s UIM carrier. The UIM carrier attempted to have the UIM claim dismissed pursuant to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the UIM carrier itself was not an employer under the Act and, instead, stepped into the shoes of the tortfeasor, thus, eliminating the exclusivity bar under the Act. Henry v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. & Fritz v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 212 A.3d 285 (Del. 2019) (consolidated appeal) (Henry I). 

In the wake of Henry I, and following a robust procedural history, the workers’ compensation carrier eventually filed an action seeking declaratory judgment, which was dismissed and appealed, and then ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s holding, for the first time, that the Act “expressly allows the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier to assert a subrogation lien against benefits paid to the employee under the employer’s uninsured motorist policy.” Horizon Servs., Inc. v. Henry, 304 A.3d 552, 555 (Del. 2023) (Henry II). The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court to develop the facts and determine the impact of the UIM non-duplication clauses. 

Back to Henry III, the Superior Court was faced with reconciling the statutory right of a workers’ compensation carrier/employer to subrogation with the contractual language of the non-duplication clause in a UIM policy. The controversy implicated competing public policies between the right to subrogation under the Act and the policy behind mandating UIM coverage through. Faced with resolving this question, Judge Brennan reasoned, given the statutory right to subrogation announced in Henry II combined with the fact that the workers’ compensation carrier was not a party to the contract with the non-duplication clause, the non-duplication clause could not be upheld. Henry III, at 12. The court noted that the way to resolve this supposed clash of public policies was to “harmonize the statutes” in a way to give both public policies meaning and effect. The simplest way to do this, the court reasoned, was to allow the plaintiff “to bring an action for all damages with the workers’ compensation lien against any damage award.” Id. at 15. In this context, there is no double recovery or duplication of indemnity since the monies paid in the UIM claim were subject to the subrogation rights of the workers’ compensation carrier/employer. 

As of this writing, Henry III is the law of Delaware and necessitates a modification of the handling of UIM claims in this and similar situations. At the very least, it requires a careful review of release language in order to ensure a resolution of all claims and liens moving forward. 

*Joshua works in our Wilmington, Delaware, office and is a member of our Casualty Department. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.