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Defense Digest

Tsunami or Business as Usual: What Does the New Motorcycle Lemon Law Hold for Pennsylvania?

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Christian A. Weimann and Dylan J. Smith

Key Points: 

  • Effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits. 
  • A nonconformity in a newly-purchased motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.” 
  • The applicable Lemon Law period for newly-purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year.

After multiple legislative attempts and years of effort, effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits. Most recently reintroduced in the Pennsylvania State Senate by Republican State Senator Michele Brooks in January 2023, Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law now provides similar consumer protections to purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania as those afforded to purchasers of new cars. Receiving bipartisan support, the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law was signed into law by Governor Josh Shapiro in November 2024.

Pennsylvania is far from the first state to allow buyers of new motorcycles to bring Lemon Law suits. Pennsylvania now joins Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as states that permit the filing of motorcycle Lemon Law suits.

State Lemon Laws throughout the country, including Pennsylvania, are intended to supplement federal consumer protection remedies—such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act and the Uniform Commercial Code—and to provide stronger protections for consumers. Under these state laws, consumers are given an avenue in civil court to enforce warranties issued by manufacturers of new motor vehicles. 

In Pennsylvania, manufacturers have a duty to “repair or correct, at no cost to the purchaser, a nonconformity which substantially impairs the use, value or safety” of a new motor vehicle purchased for personal, family, or household use. 73 Pa.C.S. § 1954(a). If there is a nonconformity in a new motor vehicle within the first 12 months or 12,000 miles of ownership, whichever comes first, and the manufacturer fails to repair the nonconformity after more than three repair attempts, or if the vehicle is out of service by reason of any nonconformity for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, then the vehicle is a presumptive lemon. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1956. Under Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law, a purchaser of a new motor vehicle that is a presumptive lemon can demand a repurchase of the vehicle by the manufacturer or have the vehicle swapped with a vehicle of comparable value. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1955.

As of May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania for personal, family, or household use can now make the same demand if there is a nonconformity in the newly-purchased motorcycle. A distinct difference, however, is that the nonconformity in the motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1954. As most motorcycle manufacturers provide limited warranties for newly purchased motorcycles ranging from one to three years, the applicable Lemon Law period for newly purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year.

So what does this change to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law mean for motorcycle manufacturers? Will motorcycle manufacturers be swept up in a tsunami of Pennsylvania Lemon Law suits now that the Commonwealth’s Lemon Law covers motorcycles? While it is too soon to say for sure, the answer is likely no. 

Recent motorcycle registration data is instructive. In 2021, there were 8,575,569 motorcycles registered in the United States, but only 18,226 new motorcycles were purchased that same year, or 0.2% of all registered motorcycles. Eric Teoh, Motorcycles Registered in the United States, 2002–2021, 7 (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) (March 2021). By way of stark contrast, there were 15,016,030 new cars and light trucks sold and leased in the United States in 2021. New and Used Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales and Leases, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://www.bts.gov/content/new-and-used-passenger-car-sales-and-leases-thousands-vehicles. 

While the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law is worth highlighting and keeping an eye on, at this juncture, motorcycle manufacturers need not panic. Rather than lawsuits, perhaps motorcycle manufacturers should really be worried that they are not selling enough new motorcycles.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.