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Case Law Alerts

No Error in Ordering Repayment for Services Where Reimbursement Was Initially Denied Because CPT Code Billed Was Not Recognized by Medicate Part B or Workers' Compensation Fee Schedules - The Nature of the Service Controls, Not the Billed CPT Code

United Automobile Insurance Company v. Chironex Enterprises, Inc., a/a/o Emily Echegaray, 4th District Case No. 4D21-2307, Nov. 30, 2022

January 1, 2023

The 4th District Court of Appeal affirmed that the trial court correctly ruled that, when determining whether a CPT code is reimbursable under the Florida PIP Statute Section 627.736(5)(a)[1](f), the insurance company must look to the nature of the service as opposed to the individual CPT code in order to determine whether said service is reimbursable. 

In the lower court, the defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that the low-level laser therapy that was billed under CPT code S8948 was compensable under the CPT code 97039. The nature of the dispute was due to the fact that S8948 is not reimbursable under the Medicare Fee Schedule, nor is it reimbursable under the Worker’s Compensation Fee Schedule. However, low level therapy itself is reimbursable under the Medicare Fee Schedule. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to reimburse the service under CPT code 97039. 

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition, finding that pursuant to Section 627.736(5) and Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jeffrey Tedder, M.D., P.A., a/a/o Jorge Perez, 111 So. 3d 960, the focus is on whether the services are reimbursable under the Medicare Part B or workers’ compensation fee schedules, not on whether the particular code is reimbursable. 

In its appeal, the defendant argued that S8948 lower laser therapy is not reimbursable under the Medicare Part B or workers’ compensation fee schedules and, therefore, the defendant was not entitled to reimbursement under section 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f). The court analyzed both section 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f) as well as the holding in United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, No. 4D21-2308 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 9, 2022); United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, No. 4D21-3336 (Fa. 4th DCA Nov. 9, 2022) and Perez, 111 So. 3d 960. In Lauderhill Medical, No. 4D21-2308, the 4th DCA made the following finding: “The language of section 627.736(5)(a)(2)(f) [now 627.736(5)(a)(1)(f)] is clear that the statute focuses on whether services, supplies, or care is ‘reimbursable under Medicare Part B’ and does not require that CPT codes be recognized by Medicare for reimbursement purposes.” The court used this analysis to conclude that in the instant case, “Focusing solely on the CPT code would be contrary to the dictates of the statute, where the relevant subsection does not even reference CPT Codes” and that laser therapy would be an unlisted modality. The court also found that while S8948 is recognized only by commercial payors, 97039 is a more general CPT code that also encompasses the therapy provided in the instant case. The plaintiff argued that section 627.736 does not require it to convert a specific, non-billable CPT code to a general reimbursable CPT code, but Perez held that insurers “would have to look beyond the CPT code to determine whether the services represented in the code are reimbursable.” Perez, 111 So. 3d at 964. 
 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2032 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.