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Michele P. Frisbie

Portrait of Michele P. Frisbie

Michele defends a wide variety of cases and has a special interest in working closely with professionals to achieve the successful, cost-effective defense of suits against specialists such as those involved in the sale, appraisal and management of real estate; insurers and insurance brokers and agents; attorneys; mental health service providers and municipal entities. Michele also has extensive experience involving personal injury such as premises liability, dog bites, automobile accidents, dram shop and hotel, restaurant and store security.

Michele has direct experience as a past board member of the Bucks County Bar Association Board of Directors and its Mandatory Continuing Education and Member Services Committee and the Central Bucks Family YMCA and its Building and Grounds and Financial Development Committees.

In 1992, she joined Marshall Dennehey as a file clerk. Michele graduated cum laude from St. Joseph's University in 1993. She attended Villanova University School of Law in 1993 and served as a law clerk until her graduation in 1996, when she joined Marshall Dennehey as an attorney. During her free time, Michele is an ACE certified group fitness instructor and a personal trainer.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Pennsylvania, 1996
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2005-2006)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Chair of Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee (2009-2012)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Board of Directors (2002-2004)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Chair Member Services Committee (2004-2007)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • "Personal Injury Exculpatory Clauses," Stafford Webinars, April 28, 2021
    • Board of Directors, Central Bucks Family YMCA
    • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice in a Magisterial District Court matter involving breach of duty allegations against members of a homeowners’ association board. The pro se plaintiff claimed the board officers violated the Pennsylvania Uniform Planned Community Act by failing to properly notice and conduct meetings, perform annual audits, and manage community funds. We successfully argued that the plaintiff’s claims were derivative in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Magisterial District Judge. “The Judge took no testimony or evidence,” and the matter was dismissed.
    • Obtained a summary judgment in favor of a HOA, with the court holding that the HOA had no duty to protect the plaintiffs from the attacks of a neighbors’ dangerous dog. On two occasions, the plaintiffs were attacked by their neighbors' dogs, causing serious injuries and permanent scarring. The plaintiffs alleged that the HOA had a duty to protect them from the co-defendants' dogs. The court granted summary judgment for the HOA, holding that under McMahon v. Pleasant Valley West Association, 952 A.2d 731 (Pa. Commw. 2008), an HOA has a “duty to the members of the common-interest community to use ordinary care and prudence in managing the property of the community that is subject to its control." However, that duty does not extend to removing an allegedly dangerous dog as the HOA has neither the obligation nor the ability to remove dogs from the community.
    • Won an arbitration in a premises liability case where the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on a container of clear hand sanitizer spilled on the floor of the baking goods aisle of a grocery store. The plaintiff acknowledged she was not looking where she was going. There was no evidence of how the substance got on the floor, how long it had been there, or that the store was aware of it. 
    • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of a products liability case filed against an alcohol beverage manufacturer. The Plaintiffs are individuals who were seriously injured or killed when the alleged minor drunk driver of the vehicle in which they were passengers was involved in a single car accident. The Plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was liable to them because the product had more alcohol than other alcohol beverages, was improperly marketed to minors, like their driver, and did not warn of the dangers associated with the beverage. Our team argued several points including that Pennsylvania does not recognize such a products liability cause of action because the dangers of drinking alcohol and driving are obvious, and the manufacturer has no duty to warn potential users of such dangers.  Additionally, alcohol is not an unreasonably dangerous product.
    • Obtained a transfer and dismissal with prejudice on a motion to dismiss in a legal malpractice action. We argued that the plaintiff’s claim that the negligence of her daughter’s court-appointed guardian ad litem led to the award of custody of the child to the father following a dependency hearing. The custody award, the plaintiff alleged, put her at a disadvantage in the divorce and damaged her and the child. First, Michele successfully argued for the transfer of the matter from the county of the mother’s residence to the county of the dependency hearing. She then successfully argued that the plaintiff had no right to bring a cause of action for herself or the child.
    • Defense verdict for a real estate seller's agent in a claim of misrepresentation of the condition of the property.
    • Defense verdict in a coverage claim arising out of wind damage to a mobile home.
    • Motion to dismiss granted in a case claiming appraisers conspired with the builder of a residential development to conceal the presence of a Superfund site adjacent to the development.
    • Motion to dismiss granted in a case against attorneys who allegedly failed to timely file a legal malpractice cause of action arising from an underlying toxic tort claim.
    • Secured the voluntary withdrawal of a case against a local sewer authority which allegedly improperly removed trees from the easement that ran over the plaintiff's property.
    • Secured the dismissal of a claim that an insurance broker allegedly failed to secure a binder for a homeowners' policy which resulted in no coverage after a fire.
    • Secured the dismissal of a mental health institution in a case where the plaintiff, a convicted murderer, claimed that if the institution had not negligently treated him for his drug and alcohol addictions, he would not have committed the crime.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.