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Co-Chair, Public Entity & Civil Rights Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Matthew J. Behr

Defense Digest

Just Because You Expunge a Record Does Not Mean Internal Affairs Records Are Not Subject to an Open Public Records Act Request

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Matthew J. Behr

Key Points: 

  • New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:52-1(a) protects records of expunged criminal charges from disclosure. 
  • In States Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, determined how far an expungement order reaches when a separate, independent, Internal Affairs investigation has occurred.
  • The Appellate Division held that the trial court should have analyzed the facts of the case to determine if there was common law right of access to the records, suggesting that the public would have an interest in disclosure and transparency.

New Jersey Statutes Annotated 2C:52-1(a) protects records of expunged criminal charges from disclosure, namely: “[r]ecords on file within any court, detention or correctional facility, law enforcement or criminal justice agency concerning a person’s detection, apprehension, arrest, detention, trial or disposition of an offense within the criminal justice system.” The question recently presented in States Newsroom, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 2024 WL 4296597 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 26, 2024), was how far an expungement order reaches when a separate, independent Internal Affairs investigation has occurred. The Appellate Division concluded the expungement statute does not unequivocally exclude Internal Affairs documents from release pursuant to the Open Public Records Act (OPRA) and the common law right to access. 

In August 2019, a lieutenant with the Jersey City Police Department hosted a barbeque for friends and family at his home. At the end of the party, there was an argument about what to do with leftovers. The fight escalated when the lieutenant retrieved his shotgun from a locked safe inside his home and then discharged the weapon. 

State Police responded to the house and found the lieutenant’s girlfriend and her son restraining him. The State Police incident report noted the lieutenant appeared to be under the influence. Police charged the lieutenant with making terroristic threats and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. The lieutenant pled guilty to a lesser charge and completed pre-trial intervention.
 
Afterwards, he sent notice to all relevant agencies to expunge their records of his criminal matter pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:52-1. Separately, the Jersey City Police Department conducted an Internal Affairs investigation into the incident. The Internal Affairs report concluded the lieutenant had negligently used a firearm while under the influence. Consequently, the Jersey City Police Department suspended the lieutenant for 90 days. 

In Rivera v. Union County Prosecutor’s Office, 250 N.J. 124, 135 (2022), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Internal Affairs reports can be accessed pursuant to a common law right of access. 

Based on Rivera, the plaintiff submitted an OPRA request for a copy of the Internal Affairs report from the defendants, who denied the request. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit seeking the Internal Affairs documents pursuant to OPRA and the common law right to access. The trial judge denied the request. Relying upon the expungement statute, the trial judge found Rivera inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

The common law right of access requires courts to consider the following: 

  1. the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; 
  2. the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance that their identities would not be disclosed; 
  3. the extent to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decision making will be chilled by disclosure; 
  4. the degree to which the information sought includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers; 
  5. whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and 
  6. whether any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may circumscribe the individual’s asserted need for the materials. 

Rivera, 250 N.J. at 144 (quoting Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986)).

Generally, the public has an interest in the disclosure of Internal Affairs reports in order to hold officers accountable and deter misconduct. Other reasons are to ensure the Internal Affairs process is working properly and to foster public trust in law enforcement. 

The Appellate Division reversed and remanded this case, holding that the trial court should have analyzed the facts of the case by applying Rivera and Loigman. While the Appellate Division did not decide the ultimate issue of whether the Internal Affairs records would be discoverable, the court did strongly suggest that it would appear that the lieutenant’s position, the misconduct he engaged in outside the scope of his work, the charges he faced, the subsequent guilty plea to a different offense and pre-trial intervention, and the Internal Affairs investigation generated in the aftermath, point to the fact the public would have an interest in disclosure and transparency. The court further required the trial judge to review the Internal Affairs report in camera and, if a determination is made for disclosure, the appropriate redactions to protect legitimate confidential information should be made.

While New Jersey generally favors disclosure of public documents, case law has made it clear that the courts must carefully review all of the factors set forth in Rivera and Loigman to determine whether Internal Affairs documents are subject to disclosure, whether an expungement order has been entered or not. As a result, whether disclosure will ultimately be ordered will be highly fact sensitive, and lawyers must be careful not to overreach in arguments, but provide the courts with practical reasons for non-disclosure. 

*Matt, a shareholder, is a member of our Professional Liability Department and works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.