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The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Ohio

The Quarterly Dose – March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Gabriella M. Wittbrod

Ohio Supreme Court Holds Ohio’s Tolling Statute Does Not Violate Federal Commerce Clause as Applied to a Physician Who Leaves the State to Practice Medicine Elsewhere
Kennedy v. Western Reserve Senior Care, --- N.E.3d ---, 2024-Ohio-5565

The Ohio Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Ohio’s tolling statute, R.C. 2305.15, as it relates to a physician who was sued for medical malpractice. The physician, who is alleged to have wrongfully caused the death of a patient in 2013, moved from Ohio to Pennsylvania after the patient’s death. The suit was voluntarily dismissed but refiled in 2019, when the health care providers moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ohio’s four-year statute of repose barred the refiling. The appellant contended that R.C. 2305.15 tolled the statute of repose because the physician had moved to Pennsylvania in the midst of this litigation. 

The court analyzed Ohio’s tolling statute under the two-tier approach established in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). First, they determined whether the law directly discriminates against interstate commerce. The court held it did not: “Nothing in the history of the tolling statute suggests that its enactment was motivated by a desire to undertake state economic protectionism.”

In the second tier of the analysis, the court applied a balancing test to determine whether the law impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. The appellees argued there are times where physicians cross state lines for legitimate business purposes, and Ohio’s tolling statute may dissuade them from traveling in or out of Ohio for fear of exposure to continuing legal liability. Yet, the court was not persuaded this is a common enough experience that interstate commerce would be noticeably affected. They held that Ohio’s tolling statute “does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that it is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.” 


 

The Quarterly Dose – March 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.