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Gabriella M. Wittbrod

Portrait of Gabriella M. Wittbrod

As an associate attorney in the Health Care Department, Gabriella defends healthcare entities in civil litigation matters including medical malpractice and long-term care liability. Given her strong background in healthcare, Gabriella utilizes her knowledge and skill to effectively represent medical professionals and providers, hospitals, and extended care facilities.

Gabriella received her B.S. in Microbiology from The Ohio State University and her J.D. from Case Western Reserve University. She is admitted to practice in the State of Ohio and the Northern and Southern Federal Districts of Ohio.

    • Case Western Reserve University School of Law (J.D., 2023)
    • The Ohio State University (B.S., 2020)
    • Ohio, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 2023
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • "State Constitutional Law: The Future of Abortion Rights?" Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine, Vol. 33, 2023

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Ohio

February 25, 2026

Ohio Appellate Courts Split on Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Damages Cap: Sixth District Enforces Limit McNalley v. Keiser, 2025-Ohio 5561 Earlier this year, the 10th District and the 8th District in Lyon v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, 2025-Ohio-2991 (10th Dist.) and Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-275 (8th Dist.), respectively, held that Ohio’s medical malpractice non-economic damages cap is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff-appellees. Ohio’s 6th District in its case, McNalley v. Keiser, 2025-Ohio-5561 (6th Dist.), held that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of showing that the non-economic damages cap was unconstitutional as applied. McNalley sued radiologist Dr. Keiser and his employer after Keiser allegedly failed to diagnose a blood clot, resulting in extensive bowel loss and short-gut syndrome. At trial, a jury awarded McNalley approximately $5.15 million, including $4.5 million in non-economic damages. Dr. Keiser moved to apply the statutory cap on non-economic damages for medical claims, which limits recovery to $500,000 for plaintiffs who suffer catastrophic injuries. McNalley opposed the motion, arguing that the statute violated both due process and equal protection as applied to him, although the 6th District noted that the substance of McNalley’s arguments suggested he was arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. The trial court denied the motion, holding the cap unconstitutional as applied to McNalley, but declined to find the statute unconstitutional on its face. On appeal, the 6th District emphasized the critical distinction between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges. In a rational basis analysis, as used here, to show that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, the movant must show beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute may be valid. To show a statute as unconstitutional as applied, a movant must show clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing set of facts that makes the statute unconstitutional when those facts are applied. Although McNalley framed his argument as an as-applied due process challenge, the court found that he failed to present clear and convincing, case-specific facts showing that the statute was unreasonable or arbitrary as applied to him. Instead, his arguments—like those relied upon by the trial court—amounted to a broader attack on the statute’s treatment of all catastrophically injured medical malpractice plaintiffs, which constitutes a facial challenge, and he did not meet the heightened standard. The court was not persuaded by the holding in Paganini, going so far as to indicate that they would have agreed with the defendants that the challenge in Paganini was actually a facial challenge and would have held differently. Accordingly, the court held that the holding in Lyon was appropriately found, based upon articulated and specific facts as applied to the plaintiff. In this case, the court noted that both parties’ arguments were nearly devoid of facts, thereby only allowing it to view the challenge as a facial challenge. Because McNalley did not meet the heightened burden required for a facial challenge and the record lacked specific factual findings supporting an as-applied challenge, the 6th District concluded that the statutory cap must be enforced. The 6th District reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to apply the noneconomic damages cap under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), reinstating the statutory limitation on McNalley’s recovery. The Ohio Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Paganini on February 10, 2026. The decision in Lyon has not been appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Ohio

November 1, 2025

Another Ohio District Court Rules that the Non-Economic Damages Cap on Catastrophic Medical Injuries Is Unconstitutional as Applied Lyon v. Riverside Methodist Hospital, (10th Dist.), 2025-Ohio-2991 Following the 8th District Court of Appeals’ ruling in Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland earlier this year, the 10th District has likewise ruled that the non-economic damages cap under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3) is unconstitutional as applied. Susana Lyon filed a medical negligence complaint against Riverside Methodist Hospital, among other defendants, for failure to diagnose a thiamine deficiency, which she alleged resulted in her developing Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome and a severe neurological injury. On April 20, 2023, a Franklin County jury awarded Lyon damages of $25,172,525.32. The breakdown of damages is as follows: Economic Damages: Past Medical Care/Expenses: $744,157.32 Future Medical Expenses: $4,428,369.00 Non-Economic Damages: Past Non-Economic Damages: $5,000,000.00 Future Non-Economic Damages: $15,000,000.00 After the trial verdict, the defendants filed a motion to enforce the non-economic damages cap of $500,000 under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), which Lyons challenged, both facially and as applied, under due process and equal protection grounds. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion and held that the damages cap is unconstitutional.  In assessing whether the trial court erred in declaring that the medical claim damages cap is unconstitutional, the 10th District considered the constitutionality of the statute both facially and as applied under both due process and equal protection grounds. Under the rational basis test, the 10th District held that the statute bears a real and substantial relation to the public interest concerns. Thus, the analysis of the statute hinges on whether the cap is unreasonable or arbitrary. Importantly, the 10th District held that under both due process and equal protection grounds, the damages cap is not facially unreasonable or arbitrary. Yet, persuaded by the 8th District’s ruling in Paganini, the 10th District held that, as applied to Lyon, the non-economic damages cap is clearly and convincingly unreasonable and arbitrary. If the cap were to be applied, Lyon’s award would be reduced by 57.4%, which the 10th District reasoned is unreasonable and arbitrary. The court also found it troubling that the statute does not adjust for inflation and calculated that the $500,000 cap that was enacted by the Ohio Legislature in 2003 would equate to only $286,475.79 as of April 2025. Thus, under due process grounds, the 10th District found that the cap is unconstitutional as applied to Lyon. Under equal protection grounds, the 10th District similarly held that, as applied to Lyon, the non-economic damages cap is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that, under Ohio law, there is no cap for non-economic damages for catastrophic injuries that are non-medical, but there is a cap for medical claims. The 10th District held:  [lit is unreasonable and arbitrary that Lyon should be treated differently in this instance than an individual that suffered catastrophic injuries in a nonmedical malpractice context. If Lyon was injured by the appellants in an automobile injury, instead of in the medical negligence setting, she would have been entitled to the full award of noneconomic damages. As of May 27, 2025, Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland is pending in the Ohio Supreme Court (2025-0386). Riverside Methodist Hospital has not yet appealed the 10th District’s ruling.   The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.