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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

To qualify as compensable under the heart-lung statute, the claimant must show “disability.”

Robert Friesen v. State of Florida Highway Patrol/Division of Risk Management, NO .1D21-1353 On appeal from Judge Massey, Decision date: Jun. 21, 2023

August 1, 2023

by Linda Wagner Farrell

The claimant, a law-enforcement officer, was hired in 2004 after undergoing a pre-employment physical. In 2008, he sought care with his primary care physician and was diagnosed with hypertension. He did not pursue a workers’ compensation claim at the time and no paperwork was completed.

In early 2019, he again sought treatment with a personal doctor and then alerted the employer. The employer/carrier agreed to pay and investigate under the 120-day rule. The claimant was authorized to treat with a cardiologist for evaluation and was diagnosed with uncontrolled hypertension and obesity. His medication was adjusted and an EKG was recommended. The authorized treating physician did not take the claimant out of work or assign any work restrictions. He presented for the EKG appointment at 11 AM, and he continued his regular working day immediately after the one-hour appointment concluded. Again, his medication was adjusted, but no work restrictions were assigned. During this time, he continued to report family issues, concerns over his blood pressure and stress related to work. He took a few vacation days, followed by two regular days off before returning to work at full-time and full duty.

The employer/carrier issued a notice of denial, asserting that his hypertension was not accompanied by disability and, therefore, not compensable. The claimant filed a petition for benefits and asserted “disabling arterial and cardiovascular, hypertension, and/or heart disease.”

At a final hearing, the claimant relied on his IME physician, a cardiologist, who essentially testified that the claimant should have been given restrictions.

The judge found that the claimant was not disabled as a result of the hour-long evaluation at the doctor’s office, pointing out that he had not been taken off work, was not sent to the hospital, and was not given any restrictions by the physician who actually saw him at the time in question. Therefore, the judge denied compensability.

On appeal, the court paid special attention to the claimant’s argument that having to wait in the authorized doctor’s office for medication to take affect and lower his blood pressure rendered him “disabled" for the purposes of section 440.151 (3). The appellate court disagreed with the claimant, and did a deep dive into the meaning of “disablement” and analyzed the case law before and after the 2003 changes. They agreed the case law was “murky” and that the issue deserved clarification.

Section 440.151(3) now instructs that “disablement" means disability as described in section 440.02(13), which states: “disability means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same, or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” The First District Court of Appeal held that no evidence was introduced showing the claimant suffered actual wage loss and at no time was he incapacitated from earning his wages because of the hypertension. Further, they refused to rely on the claimant’s expert because his opinion regarding work status was speculative and holding that such a recommendation does not mean the claimant was incapable of performing his duties.

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 8, August 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.