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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Appellate Court finds that the employer/carrier forfeits the right of seeking a one time physician change due to an untimely response.

Jace Andrews v. McKim & Creed and Travelers Property Casualty, No. 1D21-427; First District Court of Appeal; Decision date Feb. 1, 2023

March 1, 2023

by Linda Wagner Farrell

The claimant sent a written request to the employer/carrier on June 20, 2019, exercising his right to a one time change in physician. The employer/carrier failed to respond. On July 2, 2019, the claimant filed a petition for benefits, again requesting the one time change. Twenty-seven days later, the employer/carrier filed a response granting the change and naming Dr. Feiertag as the alternate physician with corresponding appointment information. The claimant did not attend the appointment. Subsequently, the claimant voluntarily dismissed the petition.

Then on July 28, 2020, the claimant filed a second petition, requesting authorization of his chosen alternate physician, Dr. Roush. Three days later, the employer/carrier indicated that the claimant’s request was denied and that Dr. Feiertag was the current authorized one time change physician. Before the hearing on the second petition, the claimant, on his own, had an evaluation from Dr. Roush.

At the hearing, the claimant argued that the employer/carrier forfeited its right of selection when it failed to timely respond to the first request on June 20, 2019. The employer/carrier argued that the claimant’s voluntary dismissal of the first petition waived or extinguished his right of selection and that filing the second petition equated to a new request for a one time change, to which it responded timely. 

The judge concluded that because the claimant did not attend the employer/carrier-scheduled appointment, he did not acquiesce to the authorization. The judge also rejected the employer’s/carrier’s argument that the claimant had forfeited his right of selection. However, the judge denied the claimant’s request for authorization of Dr. Roush because the claimant had withdrawn the request for a one time change when he voluntarily dismissed the petition in its entirety and because the second petition constituted a new request. The claimant filed a motion for rehearing, which the judge denied. This appeal followed.

The appellate court held that the judge erred: 

1.    by determining that the claimant waived his right of selection when the affirmative defense of waiver was never raised by the employer/carrier until their trial memorandum; 
2.    in holding that the voluntarily dismissal signaled a withdrawal or abandonment of the request for a one time change when the claimant had asserted his right to a one time change in writing prior to the filing of the first petition; and 
3.    by failing to adhere to the 1st District Court of Appeal’s holding in City of Bartwo v. Flores, 301 So. 3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), which held that the employer/carrier forfeits the right of selection if it fails to timely respond. 

The order was reversed and remanded for authorization and scheduling of an appointment with Dr. Roush as the claimant’s one time change physician.
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 3, March 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.