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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Once again, sufficient compliance with the drug-free workplace policy rules by employers and medical review officers is not enough.

Louis Gonzalez Chanza v. Orlando World Center Marriott and Marriott International, Inc. and Self-Insured, OJCC# 22-013883, Final Order Decision Date: 05-02-2023, Fla 1st DCA PCA Date: Oct. 9, 2024

November 1, 2024

by Linda Wagner Farrell

The claimant suffered a back injury, which he reported immediately to his supervisor. He was sent for a post-accident drug test and tested positive for THC. The employer denied the claim in its entirety due to their drug-free workplace policy (DFWP).

The claimant is an honorably discharged veteran, who sustained multiple injuries while in the service. In August 2020, he was evaluated by Dr. Tamar and obtained a “recommendation” for medical marijuana due to anxiety.

When the claimant was hired by the employer in July 2021, he acknowledged the DFWP policy and was sent for a pre-employment drug test. The drug test results were negative, and for some reason, the employer does not test for THC prior to employment. The claimant did not ask nor did he tell the employer about his medical marijuana card.

The claimant believed that his use of medical marijuana via a valid card issued by the state of Florida would fall under the category of a prescribed drug under the DFWP policy.

Following his positive post-accident drug test, the claimant spoke to the medical review officer (MRO). The claimant was asked to send his medical marijuana card but was never provided with an email address to do so. However, the employer would not have accepted that as a reasonable explanation in the claim and he would have been terminated for violating their policy.

The judge of compensation claims made the following findings: 

  1. The claimant was a “qualified patient” and Dr. Tamar a “qualified physician” under Florida Statute 386.986(1);
  2. The claimant was in possession of a valid medical marijuana card when injured; 
  3. The claimant was legally using medical marijuana prior to and during his employment; 
  4. The employer knowingly elected not to test for THC during the pre-employment drug testing, but intended to test for same in any post-injury drug test;
  5. The claimant sustained a work injury and timely reported same;
  6. The claimant was a truthful and credible witness at final merit hearing; 
  7. The claimant fully complied with post-injury actions, including reporting and drug testing and following up with the MRO; 
  8. The claimant’s belief that his prescribed medical marijuana was excusable was found to be understandable and reasonable; 
  9. The claimant’s testimony was found more credible than Dr. Portnoy’s, but only regarding the verbal notice of his positive test and the doctor’s lack of follow-up when the claimant asked to be able to provide proof of his medical marijuana card.

The judge ultimately ruled that the employer did not fully comply with all of the DFWP requirements under section 440.102 because its policy did not contain a representative sampling of the name, address and phone numbers of local drug rehab programs. Further, the policy did not comply with the portion of the statute that requires positive confirmation of the test result to the employee in writing. Dr. Portnoy placed the review on “medical hold” pending receipt of the medical marijuana card. When the card was not received, the doctor reported the positive drug test. 

The judge went on to say that the statute is expressly designed to allow a claimant to provide written notification to the MRO within five days after receipt of written notice of a confirmed positive result. That did not occur in this case. The judge further found that the employer’s policy of not testing for THC pre-employment did not comply with the statute. The judge wrote that it was logical for an average employee to reasonably believe that legally prescribed marijuana would not violate the employer’s policy if the employee passed the pre-employment drug test.

As a result of all of the above, the judge found that the presumption did not apply. The burden then shifted to the employer to prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the work-related injury was caused by the employee’s intoxication. The judge found that, that burden was also not met.

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision without a written opinion. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 11, November 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.