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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

In order to rely on the pay and investigate provision of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Statute, a letter must be sent and must be sent timely.

Churchhill v. DBI Services, LLC and Corvel Corporation, Case No. 1D 21–3199, On Appeal, Decision Date May 31, 2023

July 1, 2023

by Linda Wagner Farrell

The injured worker, a rest area attendant, mixed a solution for cleaning that allegedly exploded in her face, causing an immediate chemical reaction, on November 1, 2020. The claim was accepted as compensable on November 13, 2020. The carrier paid for prescriptions on November 10, 2020, and initiated indemnity benefits on November 13, 2020. Furthermore, the employer/carrier authorized follow-up with a pulmonologist and an ophthalmologist and paid intermittent indemnity benefits through February 7, 2021.

It was not until two months after the accident, on January 8, 2021, that a 120-day pay and investigate letter went to the claimant and her attorney. Later, on January 25, 2021, a notice of denial was issued, but the adjuster testified that this was an error. The claimant was authorized for testing and follow-up care on February 22, 2021. A second notice of denial was then issued on February 24, 2021.

A petition for benefits was filed, and the employer/carrier filed a response denying the claim, indicating that the claimant was unable to meet her burden of proof. 

In the pre-trial stipulations, the employer/carrier altered their position in some respects. They agreed to accept responsibility and payment for payment of all medical bills and treatment through February 24, 2021. The claimant argued waiver and that the employer/carrier failed to comply with the pay and investigate provisions in Sections 440. 192(8) and 440.20 (4), Florida Statutes. A final hearing took place, and the judge issued an order. 

The judge ruled that the claimant failed to meet her burden of proof, with clear and convincing evidence, as required for the toxic exposure portion of the statute. The judge did not address the waiver or estoppel argument made by the claimant. Furthermore, the judge did not rule on the issue of entitlement or the amount of attorney’s fees for the conceded medical bills and did not reserve on that issue.

The claimant moved for rehearing, and the judge denied the claim for attorney’s fees and any remaining issues. This appeal followed.

The stand-out portion of the appellate court’s written opinion relates to the pay and investigate provision. Section 440.20 (4) requires that if a carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits, they shall provide written notice to the employee that it has elected to pay and investigate the claim. The letter is meant to put the claimant on notice so that they can preserve evidence for potential litigation regarding an entitlement to benefits. Without a pay and investigate letter, employers/carriers who have furnished benefits are deemed to have accepted the employee’s injuries as compensable or have waived the right to deny compensability, unless they can establish material facts relevant to the issue of compensability that could not have been discovered through reasonable investigation within the 120-day period. 

The First District Court of Appeals held that an employer/carrier’s election to delay their decision about compensability by opting to pay and investigate requires written notice, and the letter does not start the 120-day period because the initial provision of compensation or benefits does. The letter only invokes the right to rely on the pay and investigate statutory mechanism. The court indicated, “and only a timely letter will suffice.”

For this, and other reasons, the case was reversed and remanded.
 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 7, July 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.