.

Kevin M. McKeon

Portrait of Kevin M. McKeon

Kevin has more than 40 years of experience representing manufacturers, corporations, and businesses in complex civil litigation, including product liability, product warranty, premises liability, and trucking and transportation matters. He regularly defends manufacturers and transportation-related businesses in high-exposure matters and has successfully obtained dismissals on behalf of defendants in product liability cases.

His product warranty practice includes defending claims brought under federal and state statutes, including the Pennsylvania and New Jersey lemon laws, as well as breach of warranty and consumer fraud acts. Kevin also represents defendants in premises liability actions.

Kevin has litigated matters for major manufacturers across a wide range of industries, including automobiles, trucks, boats, homes, and recreational vehicles and equipment. He has additional experience representing warranty and service contract companies, builders, and related businesses.

Kevin has tried more than 75 cases to jury verdicts, as well as numerous bench trials, and has experience handling class actions. He has also argued before appellate courts, including the New Jersey Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Kevin is admitted to practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and holds an AV® Preeminent™ rating from LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1986)
    • Boston College (A.B., 1983)
    • New Jersey, 1986
    • Pennsylvania, 1986
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1986
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1986
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1996
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2008
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2005)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Panelist, PBS television shows, Consumer Fraud Issues
    • Swarthmore's Who's Who
    • American Boat and Yacht Council
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Warranty Defense Counsel
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of all claims against their client in a personal injury action arising from a December 22, 2021 workplace accident. The plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries while unloading pharmaceutical products from a tractor trailer. Although the lawsuit was timely filed against other defendants, plaintiffs' counsel did not name our client as a defendant until filing a Fourth Amended Complaint—more than two years after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The court agreed that the plaintiff failed to exercise the due diligence required under New Jersey Rule 4:26-4 to identify the client as a defendant before the limitations period expired and granted the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).
    • Malin v. Bayliner Corp., 148 F. 3d 1154 (3rd Cir. 1998), Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed trial court's dismissal of boat manufacturer after lengthy trial involving claims of breach of warranty, fraud, revocation of acceptance.
    • Palmucci v. Brunswick Corp., 311 N.J. Super. 607, 710 A. 2d 1045 (App. Div. 1998). Holding that manufacturers are entitled to at least one opportunity to cure an allegedly defective product prior to plaintiff filing suit.
    • Wanetick v. OCT Partnership, 318 N.J. Super. 156, 723 A. 2d 100 (App. Div. 1999). Holding that an ultimate outcome charge must be given to a jury in a consumer fraud case.
    • Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F. 3d 578 (3rd Cir. 1997). Determining federal jurisdictional issues and stating that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for actions of a dealer absent an indicia of ownership of the dealer in a consumer fraud case.
    • Poli v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 349 N.J. Super. 169, 793 A. 2d 104 (App. Div. 2001). holding that there is a two-year statute of limitation in a lemon law claim, and addressing breach of warranty statute of limitation issues.
    • Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishi, 163 N.J. 484, 750 A. 2d 79 (2000). New Jersey Supreme Court ruling holding that an ultimate outcome charge must be given to a jury in a Consumer Fraud Act case; Model Jury Charges amended to reflect this ruling.
    • Ryan v. American Honda, 186 N.J. 431, 896 A. 2d 454 (2006). Holding that leases are covered in New Jersey under the federal Magnuson Moss Warranty Act.
    • Divigenze v. Chrysler Corp., 345 N.J. Super. 314, 785 A. 2d 37 (App. Div. 2001), cert. den. 171 N.J. 442, 794 A. 2d 181 (2002). Addressing plaintiff's burden of proof and jury instructions in a lemon law case.
    • Obtained complete summary judgments dismissing entire cases for multiple automobile manufacturers in numerous cases in New Jersey and Pennsylvania involving the Pennsylvania and New Jersey lemon laws, breach of warranty (Uniform Commercial Code), Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and consumer fraud statutes.
    • Had plaintiff dismiss product liability fire loss case against product manufacturer in claim for over $500,000 in property damage by proving through experts that client's product did not cause fire.
    • Had plaintiff dismiss products liability case against exercise equipment manufacturer in personal injury case by establishing that client's product did not cause the injury and injury either did not take place or was caused by the defendants.
    • Defense verdict in jury trial on behalf of boat manufacturer in product warranty case where plaintiff claimed a defect in a boat led to a boat sinking in Atlantic Ocean.
    • Obtained summary judgment relief for owner and driver of tow truck involved in multi-vehicle fatality crash. Our clients’ truck was struck from behind while towing another vehicle. The striking vehicle was a correctional facility transport van, which was transporting two inmates and two correctional officers. The impact caused injuries to both occupants of the tow truck and to all four occupants of the van, including fatal injuries to one of the inmates. Our clients were target defendants of the plaintiff correctional officer who was a passenger in the van, given the immunity provided to the Department of Corrections and its driver by the worker’s compensation bar.  At the conclusion of discovery, the Court accepted our motion based on the argument that a jury could not reasonably find our driver negligent despite the allegation that he had been driving too slow and despite the fact that he had received numerous citations for motor vehicle and towing violations. Our argument relied upon the uncontroverted expert opinions reached by the State Police’s accident investigator and our own accident reconstruction expert.
    • "Impaired Cognizance of Injury From Sexual Abuse May Not Trigger the Discovery Rule," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 6, December 2000
    • "Strict Liability and Negligence Claims May be Barred in New Jersey Products Liability Cases Involving Damage to the Product," Defense Digest, 1998-02, Vol. 4, No. 1
    • "The Defense of Charitable Organizations Takes a Turn for the Better," Defense Digest, April 1995
    • Miranda v. MarineMax, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2419 (App. Div. 2013)
    • McGarvey v. Penske, 486 Fed. Appx. 276 (3rd Cir. 2012)
    • Washington v. Thiele Manuf., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66547 (D.N.J. 2012)
    • Patel v. American Honda Motor Co., 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1146 (App. Div. 2011)
    • Ferrari v. American Honda Motor Co., 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 346 (App. Div. 2009)
    • Smith v. Cavalier Builders, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23457 (D.N.J. 2008)
    • Divigenze v. Chrysler Corp., 345 N.J. Super. 314, 785 A.2d 37 (cert. den. 171 N.J. 442, 794 A.2d 181 2002)
    • Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishi, et al, 163 N.J. 484, 750 A.2d 79 (2002)
    • Poli v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 349 N.J. Super. 169, 793 A.2d 104 (App. Div. 2001)
    • Wanetick v. OCT Partnership, 318 N.J. Super. 156, 723 A.2d 100 (App. Div. 1999)
    • Palmucci v. Brunswick Corporation, 311 N.J. Super. 607, 710 A.2d 1045 (App. Div. 1998)
    • Suber v. Chrysler Corporation, 104 F.3d 578 (3rd Cir. 1997)
    • Commercial Arbitrator - Camden County, New Jersey

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.