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Defense Digest

The Impact of the DiFiore Case on Defense Medical Exams

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

by Kevin M. McGoldrick

Key Points:

  • New Jersey Appellate Division holds plaintiffs bear the burden of justifying the presence of third parties or recording devices at defense medical exams.
  • New Jersey Appellate Division issues guidelines for third-party recording in defense medical exams.
  • New Jersey Appellate Division updates guidelines for defense medical exams.
  • New Jersey Appellate Division rules that plaintiffs require court permission to record or have a third party observe independent medical exams.

New Jersey Rule 4:19 permits an adverse party to require the party whose physical or mental condition is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination by an expert. Defense medical exams (DMEs) and the reports generated following the exam are often at the crux of developing a defensive strategy. Aside from the notice and scheduling requirements, the rule offers little in terms of the manner in which the exam is to be conducted. On May 3, 2022, the New Jersey Appellate Division decided the matter of DiFiore v. Pezic, 275 A.3d 58 (N.J. App. Div. May 3, 2022). The court revisited whether injured plaintiffs are allowed to bring a third party or a recording device to a DME. Prior to DiFiore, the Appellate Division had not addressed this issue since deciding B.D. v. Carley, 704 A.2d 979 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998), 24 years ago.

In DiFiore, the Appellate Division reexamined this issue in three unrelated personal injury cases: DiFiore v. Pezic, Remache-Robalino v. Boulos, and DeLeon v. The Achilles Foot and Ankle Group. In all three cases, the plaintiffs had cognitive limitations, psychological impairments or language barriers, and plaintiffs’ counsel, over defense objections, requested that their clients be accompanied by a third party and/or be permitted to record the DME by audio or visual means. In all three cases, the trial courts issued different rulings on how the DME should proceed. In DiFiore, the trial court precluded the plaintiff from bringing a third party or recording the DME by video, but allowed her to make an audio recording of the DME. In Remache-Robalino, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to record the DME by audio means. Lastly, in DeLeon, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to have a third party at the DME and issued an order requiring the plaintiff’s DME to proceed unmonitored and unrecorded. All three decisions were appealed and consolidated by the Appellate Division.

Upon review, and with participation of the New Jersey Association for Justice, New Jersey Defense Association, and Office of Attorney General, the DiFiore court held:

  1. A disagreement over whether to permit third-party observation or recording of a DME shall be evaluated by the trial judge on a case-by-case basis with no absolute prohibitions or entitlements;
  2. Despite the contrary language in B.D. v. Carley, it shall be the plaintiff’s burden henceforth to justify to the court that third-party presence or recording, or both, are appropriate in a particular case;
  3. Given the advances in technology since 1998, the range of options should include video recording, using a fixed camera that captures the actions and words of both the examiner and the plaintiff;
  4. To the extend that examiners hired by the defense are concerned that a third-party observer or a recording might reveal alleged proprietary information about the content and sequence of the exam, the parties shall cooperate to enter into a protective order, so that such information is solely used for the purposes of the case and not otherwise divulged;
  5. If the court permits a third-party to attend the DME, it shall impose reasonable conditions to prevent the observer from interacting with the plaintiff or otherwise interfering with the exam; and
  6. If a foreign or sign language interpreter is needed for the exam, the examiner shall utilize a neutral interpreter agreed upon by the parties, or, if such agreement is not attained, an interpreter selected by the court.

What we can take from DiFiore is that it now overturns the previous parameters set forth in B.D. v. Carley. Since 1998, Carley has long held that plaintiffs were entitled to have the DMEs recorded by an unobtrusive recording device. DiFiore notes what has often been questioned by Carly, that it offers little guidance as to the exams themselves, the manner in which they are to be conducted and what potentially could lead to conflicting trial court interpretation.

The question becomes, does DiFiore provide more clarity than what has been in place for 24 years or does it leave more questions to be answered? Although it does not completely prohibit third-party observation or the recording of an examination, it does place the burden upon the plaintiff to justify the condition being sought in the event of a dispute between parties, and, thereafter, the court is to decide whether to permit the observation or recording on a case-by-case basis.

By placing the burden on plaintiffs to establish special conditions that warrant the presence of third parties and recording devices, the court’s decision makes clear that the use of such measures is the exception rather than the rule. We expect that the presence of third parties and recording devices at DMEs will be limited to circumstances where the plaintiff is very young or very old, or where he or she has significant cognitive impairments, psychological problems, or language barriers that warrant the use of such measures. DiFiore comes more than two decades after Carley and reflects how litigation has changed since. The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal, and only time will tell if DiFiore becomes the new norm, or if the Supreme Court will fill in the gaps that the case leaves behind.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.