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Karen "Missy" E. Minehan

Portrait of Karen "Missy" E. Minehan

Missy is a member of the Health Care Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of professional medical negligence and premises liability claims, as well as medical licensing matters before licensing boards such as the Pennsylvania Boards of Medicine, Osteopathic Medicine, Nursing, and Psychology. Her individual clients include physicians, nurses, Patient Care Technicians (PCTs), Certified Nurses Aides (CNAs), therapists, mental health professionals, and other health care providers. Missy’s institutional clients include acute and rehabilitation hospitals, long-term and skilled nursing facilities, correctional medicine providers, and outpatient dialysis facilities.

Missy has handled matters encompassing a wide range of medical issues, including retained foreign objects, ob/gyn, wound care, patient falls, and neurological injuries. She has significant jury trial, arbitration, mediation, appellate, and administrative law experience.

After receiving her undergraduate degree from Wellesley College, where she played intercollegiate soccer and spent her junior year in Paris, France and Yaounde, Cameroon, Missy graduated from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs with a J.D. and a Master's Degree in International Affairs.

Missy's bar admissions include the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and U.S. District Court for the Western, Middle, and Eastern Districts of Pennsylvania. She is a member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association. She is frequently called upon to lecture on a wide array of topics in the field of health care litigation.

Outside of her professional career, Missy is an active volunteer in her local community. She served as a Girl Scout leader to a troop that advanced from Brownie to Ambassador. She interviewed prospective high school students for admission to Wellesley College as an alumna volunteer and served as the President and Vice President of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Wellesley College Club. She worked as a puppy sitter for the Susquehanna Service Dog. An avid skier, Missy co-founded and continues to lead the Camp Hill Middle and High School Ski & Snowboard Club. In addition, Missy is currently a Member and the Secretary of the Cleve J. Fredricksen Library Board of Trustees. 

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (M.A., 1996)
    • Wellesley College (B.A., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2018
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2006-2007)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Cleve J. Fredricksen Library Board of Trustees, Member and Secretary
    • Girl Scouts in the Heart of Pennsylvania, former Troop Leader
    • Southeastern Pennsylvania Wellesley Club, Member, former President, former Vice President
    • Mitigating and Responding to a Professional Liability Claim: Documentation, Discovery, and Depositions, Skilled Nursing Development Institute's Administrator Appreciation Event, August 6, 2025
    • Arbitration Agreements: Hot Topics and Best Practices, client webinar, March 19, 2025
    • Trends, Tips, and Tricks in the Defense of Long-Term Care Facilities, PACHRM/PDI Conference, July 14, 2023
    • From Arbitrations to Schedule Zs: Trends, Tips and Tricks to Navigate the Written Discovery Process in Long-Term Care Civil Litigation, Marshall Dennehey Trends in Health Care and Health Law Seminar, May 5, 2022
    • Reduce Your Risk: Understanding the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), February 18, 2021
    • Pitfalls of Social Media and Nursing, May 8, 2018
    • ED Documentation: Are You Writing Enough?,  April 2018
    • Event Management, Documentation and Disclosure: Trends, Dangers and Best Practices, March 2015
    • Understanding Advance Health Care Directives in Pennsylvania, March 2015
    • General Liability, Professional Liability and Other Interesting Litigation Issues, February 26, 2015
    • The Medical Licensing System in Pennsylvania, 2012
    • Expert Retention, Review, and Testimony: From Start to Finish, October 8, 2007
    • Defensive Documentation, co-presenter, April 2007
    • Medical Records Law in Pennsylvania as it Pertains to Litigation Issues, co-presenter, Lorman Education Services, August 2006
    • A Statutory Tour Through the Peer Review Protection Act, MCARE Act and the Patient Quality Improvement Act of 2005, co-presenter, October 2005
    • Avoiding Lawsuits and Facing the Ones You Cannot Avoid: Documentation, Event Review, Deposition and Trial Testimony, co-presenter, May 2005
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law as it Relates to HMA Medical Malpractice, co-presenter, January 2005
    • Best Practices for Hospital Investigation of Patient Care, October 2004
    • “The New and Broadened Law Governing Venue in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Cases,” Defense Digest, JDSupra, March 2023
    • “The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?,” 18 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 795 (1996)
    • Obtained a defense award on behalf of a skilled nursing facility in a wound case after a two-day arbitration. 

Results

Defense Award Obtained in a Contested Wound Case

We secured a defense award on behalf of a skilled nursing facility in a hotly contested “wound” case after a two-day arbitration. The 93-year-old plaintiff had been a resident at the nursing facility for over three years without having suffered any pressure injuries, despite a plethora of risk factors. In August 2019, she was transferred emergently to an acute care hospital where she was diagnosed with a myocardial infarction (MI) and cardiogenic shock. The hospital administered five days of a vasopressor, a life-saving medication that can increase the risk of pressure injuries, and recommended that she consult with palliative medicine due to her poor condition and prognosis. Within several weeks of her return to our client’s facility, she was found to have a Stage III left heel wound and a Stage II left buttocks wound. The wounds were treated and resolved within four and five months, respectively. At 99 years of age, she still resides at the facility.

Defense Verdict in Ohio Medical Malpractice Case

We obtained a medical malpractice defense verdict on behalf of a skilled nursing facility in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court in Cleveland, Ohio. The children of an 82-year-old skilled nursing resident brought a lawsuit after their mother developed shingles and associated meningitis and passed away. They claimed the facility had inadequate infection control and failed to identify signs/symptoms of developing changes in their mother’s condition. The defense proved the facility offered the appropriate vaccinations that were required by the state of Ohio and that the standard of care did not require the facility offer or administer the Shingrix vaccine to its residents. They also proved the facility properly monitored the resident’s signs and symptoms; that she did not exhibit any classic signs or symptoms of shingles at the facility; and that the facility timely sent her to the ER for evaluation when her condition changed.  In closing arguments after a five-day trial, the plaintiffs asked the jury for $3 million. The jury deliberated for 75 minutes and returned with a defense verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

The New and Broadened Law Governing Venue in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Cases

March 1, 2023

Key Points: Recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court actions may dramatically broaden the counties in which plaintiffs may file medical malpractice actions. Such actions can now be filed and litigated hundreds of miles from the facility where care was provided, where the witnesses live or work, and even where the plaintiffs themselves live. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s amendment of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, combined with the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s reduction in the threshold for venue in Hangey v. Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc., 247 A.3d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2021), alloc. granted, 278 A.3d 301 (Pa. 2022), have the potential to dramatically broaden the counties in which plaintiffs may file medical malpractice actions. Gone are the days when medical malpractice actions were venued solely in the county where the cause of action arose. Now, such actions can be filed and litigated hundreds of miles from the facility where care was provided, where the witnesses live or work, and even where the plaintiffs themselves live. By order dated August 25, 2022, the Supreme Court amended Pennsylvania’s venue rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, by deleting Rule 1006(a.1), which provided that medical malpractice actions must be filed “only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” The effect of deleting Rule 1006(a.1) is to make medical malpractice actions subject to the same venue standards that apply to all other types of civil cases. This significant change became effective on January 1, 2023. What will it mean going forward? It means that medical malpractice cases now may be filed where a defendant may be served, the cause of action arose, or a relevant transaction or occurrence took place. This is crucial because, just as the former medical malpractice venue rule was being rescinded, so, too, were the usual venue rules being relaxed. In the non-medical malpractice context, venue is generally determined by assessing whether a defendant’s contacts with the plaintiff’s chosen venue are of sufficient quantity and quality. Although there was never a hard-and-fast rule, the quantity test traditionally has been satisfied if the defendant does about 1% or more of its business in the plaintiff’s chosen venue. This percentage standard was viewed as fair because it applied equally to large and small businesses. However, in Hangey, the Superior Court en banc (by a vote of 7-2) made it much easier for plaintiffs to obtain venue over businesses in counties other than the county where the cause of action arose. In particular, the Superior Court held that venue could lie over a defendant who does only .005% of its business or $75,000 in total business in a forum. This extremely low volume of business expands the ability of plaintiffs to secure venue in locations with minimal connection to the lawsuit. On May 10, 2022, the Supreme Court accepted review in Hangey and it will hear argument in March of 2023. The Supreme Court could reverse, affirm, or even further dilute the low venue standard adopted by the Superior Court in Hangey. In the meantime, Hangey is currently the law and will also dilute the new venue standard that applies to medical malpractice cases, effective January 1, 2023, as a result of the Supreme Court’s amendment to Rule 1006. The Superior Court continued to pick away at the venue standard in Quigley v. Pottstown Hospital, LLC, 2022 WL 17347500 (Pa. Super. Dec. 1, 2022). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the deceased, an elderly dementia patient, was sexually assaulted while a patient of Pottstown Hospital in Montgomery County. The trial court transferred the case from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County. The Superior Court reversed the transfer and returned the case to Philadelphia. The Superior Court held that the case should not have been transferred to Montgomery County because Tower Health, the hospital’s parent company and co-defendant, regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County through its unrelated subsidiaries. Specifically, the Superior Court found that Tower Health had the requisite quality and quantity of contacts with Philadelphia County because it: (1) owned multiple Philadelphia properties, an acute-care hospital, two urgent care facilities, and a children’s hospital; (2) was the managing partner of an LLC that owned a Philadelphia children’s hospital; (3) conducted medical billing of its subsidiary hospitals through a Philadelphia post office box; and (4) actively asserted control and authority over its subsidiaries by procuring insurance policies, providing them with general counsel, conducting hospital CEO performance reviews and disciplinary actions, ratifying the hospital’s Board of Directors, and implementing acute care hospital federal mandates. Hence, although the cause of action arose in Montgomery County, and even before the implementation of the new Rule 1006 on January 1, 2023, the Superior Court found venue proper in Philadelphia. This decision attributed the activities of related corporations to Pottstown Hospital in a way that is new to Pennsylvania law, which has traditionally respected corporate formalities and not eroded those formalities by attributing the acts of one corporation to another. Many major health systems, parent companies, and long-term care “home offices” have a presence in Pennsylvania’s pro-plaintiff hotbeds (especially Philadelphia, Allegheny, Lackawanna, and Luzerne Counties). Hence, when we combine the impacts of the venue rule change, Hangey, and Quigley, it seems that Pennsylvania is returning to a time when plaintiffs can file suit in nearly any venue, regardless of whether that venue has any legitimate connection to the facts, litigants, or witnesses.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.