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Defense Digest

The New and Broadened Law Governing Venue in Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Cases

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

by Karen "Missy" E. Minehan

Key Points:

  • Recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court actions may dramatically broaden the counties in which plaintiffs may file medical malpractice actions.
  • Such actions can now be filed and litigated hundreds of miles from the facility where care was provided, where the witnesses live or work, and even where the plaintiffs themselves live.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s amendment of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, combined with the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s reduction in the threshold for venue in Hangey v. Husqvarna Professional Products, Inc., 247 A.3d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2021), alloc. granted, 278 A.3d 301 (Pa. 2022), have the potential to dramatically broaden the counties in which plaintiffs may file medical malpractice actions. Gone are the days when medical malpractice actions were venued solely in the county where the cause of action arose. Now, such actions can be filed and litigated hundreds of miles from the facility where care was provided, where the witnesses live or work, and even where the plaintiffs themselves live.

By order dated August 25, 2022, the Supreme Court amended Pennsylvania’s venue rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1006, by deleting Rule 1006(a.1), which provided that medical malpractice actions must be filed “only in a county in which the cause of action arose.” The effect of deleting Rule 1006(a.1) is to make medical malpractice actions subject to the same venue standards that apply to all other types of civil cases. This significant change became effective on January 1, 2023.

What will it mean going forward? It means that medical malpractice cases now may be filed where a defendant may be served, the cause of action arose, or a relevant transaction or occurrence took place. This is crucial because, just as the former medical malpractice venue rule was being rescinded, so, too, were the usual venue rules being relaxed. In the non-medical malpractice context, venue is generally determined by assessing whether a defendant’s contacts with the plaintiff’s chosen venue are of sufficient quantity and quality. Although there was never a hard-and-fast rule, the quantity test traditionally has been satisfied if the defendant does about 1% or more of its business in the plaintiff’s chosen venue. This percentage standard was viewed as fair because it applied equally to large and small businesses.

However, in Hangey, the Superior Court en banc (by a vote of 7-2) made it much easier for plaintiffs to obtain venue over businesses in counties other than the county where the cause of action arose. In particular, the Superior Court held that venue could lie over a defendant who does only .005% of its business or $75,000 in total business in a forum. This extremely low volume of business expands the ability of plaintiffs to secure venue in locations with minimal connection to the lawsuit. On May 10, 2022, the Supreme Court accepted review in Hangey and it will hear argument in March of 2023. The Supreme Court could reverse, affirm, or even further dilute the low venue standard adopted by the Superior Court in Hangey. In the meantime, Hangey is currently the law and will also dilute the new venue standard that applies to medical malpractice cases, effective January 1, 2023, as a result of the Supreme Court’s amendment to Rule 1006.

The Superior Court continued to pick away at the venue standard in Quigley v. Pottstown Hospital, LLC, 2022 WL 17347500 (Pa. Super. Dec. 1, 2022). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the deceased, an elderly dementia patient, was sexually assaulted while a patient of Pottstown Hospital in Montgomery County. The trial court transferred the case from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County. The Superior Court reversed the transfer and returned the case to Philadelphia. The Superior Court held that the case should not have been transferred to Montgomery County because Tower Health, the hospital’s parent company and co-defendant, regularly conducted business in Philadelphia County through its unrelated subsidiaries.

Specifically, the Superior Court found that Tower Health had the requisite quality and quantity of contacts with Philadelphia County because it: (1) owned multiple Philadelphia properties, an acute-care hospital, two urgent care facilities, and a children’s hospital; (2) was the managing partner of an LLC that owned a Philadelphia children’s hospital; (3) conducted medical billing of its subsidiary hospitals through a Philadelphia post office box; and (4) actively asserted control and authority over its subsidiaries by procuring insurance policies, providing them with general counsel, conducting hospital CEO performance reviews and disciplinary actions, ratifying the hospital’s Board of Directors, and implementing acute care hospital federal mandates. Hence, although the cause of action arose in Montgomery County, and even before the implementation of the new Rule 1006 on January 1, 2023, the Superior Court found venue proper in Philadelphia. This decision attributed the activities of related corporations to Pottstown Hospital in a way that is new to Pennsylvania law, which has traditionally respected corporate formalities and not eroded those formalities by attributing the acts of one corporation to another.

Many major health systems, parent companies, and long-term care “home offices” have a presence in Pennsylvania’s pro-plaintiff hotbeds (especially Philadelphia, Allegheny, Lackawanna, and Luzerne Counties). Hence, when we combine the impacts of the venue rule change, Hangey, and Quigley, it seems that Pennsylvania is returning to a time when plaintiffs can file suit in nearly any venue, regardless of whether that venue has any legitimate connection to the facts, litigants, or witnesses.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.