.

John H. Osorio

Chair Emeritus, Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of John H. Osorio

John serves as Chair Emeritus of the Architectural, Engineering & Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group. In this capacity, he oversees a large group of attorneys throughout many of the firm's offices dedicated in the defense of construction professionals.

For over 30 years, John has handled more than 500 matters in the defense of architectural and engineering firms, general contractors, subcontractors, developers, and owners in litigation matters involving personal injury and property damage. The scope of his representation includes construction and design defect matters, breach of contract, delay damage cases, indemnity and coverage, and construction code and safety violation claims.

In addition to John's vast experience in an all matters of construction litigation, he has handled many hundreds of matters involving personal injury, product liability, and catastrophic loss matters. 

John graduated from the University of Montana in 1979 with a Bachelor of Arts in history and political science. He then went on to receive his juris doctor from Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles, California.

    • Southwestern University School of Law (J.D., 1984)
    • University of Montana (B.A., 1979)
    • New Jersey, 1985
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1985
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026-2027)

    The Best Lawyers in America® list is published by Best Lawyers®. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2005)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Gloucester County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Defense Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Construction Defect Litigation in New York and New Jersey, Client Webinar, December 2020
    • Construction Defect Conference Architect & Engineers in Construction Defect Claims, Panelist at Perrin
    • Struggles and Successes of the Past 25 Years, Panelist at West Coast Casualty Conference
    • Risk Transfer in Construction Defect Litigation, client seminars 
    • The Professional (Architect & Engineer) Part in Construction Defect Claims, Panelist, 2nd Annual National Construction Defect Conference, November 2016
    • Minimizing Risk and Avoiding Consequences as a Design Professional in the State of New Jersey
    • Defending Roof Collapse Cases
    • Defending Architect and Engineer Malpractice Claims in New Jersey
    • The Applicability of the Economic Loss Doctrine to Design Professional Claims
    • "Additional Insured Status of Design Professionals," Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998
    • Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of Invited Attorneys
    • Successfully argued before the Supreme court of New Jersey in defense of a general contractor defending allegations of construction defect brought by a subsequent condominium association owner.  The Supreme Court held that a construction defect lawsuit must be filed within six years from when the building's original or subsequent owner first knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the basis for a cause of action. A subsequent owner stands in no better position than a prior owner in calculating the limitations period. If a prior owner knew or reasonably should have known of the basis for a construction defect action, the  limitations period began at that point. If the building's owner knew or reasonably should have known of construction defects at the time of the sale of the property, the purchaser takes title subject to the original owner's right – and any limitation on that right – to file a claim against the architect and contractors. Thus, a subsequent owner will stand in the shoes of a prior owner for statute of limitations purposes.
    • Successfully argued before the Supreme Court of New Jersey on behalf of a major amusement park owner resulting in the seminal Supreme Court decision on the allocation of liability on behalf of the client as against a sovereign entity that was dismissed from the case due to the plaintiff’s failure to add the sovereign as a direct defendant prior to the expiration of the notice provisions of the torts claim act. Based on our representation, the jury would be instructed to allocate liability for the sovereign’s negligence thus offsetting any potential negligence against the client
    • Represented and successfully resolved a $10 million plus claim brought by a railroad company alleging damage to a bridge as the result of a dam removal and stream restoration project. The matter involved the assertion of design deficiency claims involving geotechnical and hydrological investigation and the means and methods of construction implemented by the general contractor. 
    • Represented a large general contractor in over ten construction defect cases involving high rise condominium and apartment complexes brought by condominium associations and owners.  
    • Successfully represented a solar energy contractor in a breach of contract suit involving the installation of solar panels on numerous public schools in the State of Hawaii, islands of O’ahu and Kauai. The matter was tried for over three weeks heard by a three person binding arbitration panel. After the conclusion of our case in chief, the plaintiff accepted a settlement upon client’s terms. 
    • Successfully tried engineering malpractice claim where the demand was $1.3 million by proving client's design was altered and not the proximate cause of community wastewater treatment facility's failure.
    • Successfully settled multi-plaintiff burn and personal injury case by orchestrating a settlement fund with equal contributions by multiple defendants, thus, capping catastrophic exposure and resolving liability among defendants.
    • Successfully settled multimillion dollar claim by high-rise condominium owners by way of mediation.
    • Successfully resolved multi-plaintiff burn case by way of mediation and use of extensive experts to reduce potential liability.
    • Successfully resolved wrongful death construction case and convinced mediator that general contractor client was the least culpable of all defendants.
    • Amicably resolved $25 million burn claim through negotiated settlement in multiple defendant litigation wherein we represented design professional who contributed to the design of a hydrogen furnace which exploded. Obtained settlement through small contribution by establishing limited liability for proximate cause of the accident.
    • Obtained summary judgment for a developer and general contractor in a construction defect case. The plaintiff, a homeowners association, sued multiple parties seeking $2.5 million in damages related to water infiltration due to the allegedly negligent installation of roofing, exterior cladding, windows, doors, railings and decks. We also represented several previous developer/association board members who were sued individually. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff filed a claim with the state of New Jersey under the Home Owners Warranty program.
    • Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a defendant engineering firm in a two week jury trial alleging negligence in the design of a subsurface disposal field.
    • Obtained dismissal of a negligent design claim against a design professional, after a three day Evidentiary Hearing (Lopez hearing) to establish the accrual date for the applicable Statute of Limitations. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.