.

Joan Orsini Ford

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Medical Injury Practice

Shareholder

Portrait of Joan Orsini Ford

Joan focuses her practice exclusively on medical malpractice litigation involving the defense of hospitals, doctors, nurses, physicians' assistants, nursing homes, long-term care facilities and behavioral health treatment facilities. She also handles other healthcare-related issues. Throughout her career, Joan has handled in excess of 1,000 medical malpractice cases, including numerous high-exposure cases involving catastrophic injuries and death in infants and adults. She has taken more than 50 major jury cases to verdict in state and federal courts with overwhelmingly favorable results.

After receiving a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from LaSalle University in 1984, Joan attended Widener University where she earned her juris doctor in 1986. At Widener, she participated in the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. Her legal education also included courses at Notre Dame School of Law in London, England, and The Dickenson Law School in Florence, Italy. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 1997, Joan worked for a defense firm for nine years where she also concentrated on medical malpractice defense, primarily representing physicians.

Joan has lectured for various organizations over the course of her career, and has given presentations to nursing and medical staff at multiple hospitals on litigation related issues. In addition, she has served as an instructor in the firm's annual Advanced Trial Advocacy Mock Trial Program.

In 2021, Joan received the James P. Fox Trial Lawyer of the Year Award from the Montgomery Bar Association Trial Lawyers Section. The award recognizes not only exceptional skill as a civil litigation and trial lawyer, but also a dedication to promoting a positive image for attorneys through one’s professional demeanor, service and integrity. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1986)
    • La Salle University (B.A., 1984)
    • Pennsylvania, 1987
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1988
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • 2021 James P. Fox Trial Lawyer of the Year Award, Montgomery Bar Association Trial Lawyers Section
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2013 to Present
    • Montgomery Bar Association, 1987 to present
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Board of Directors, 2017
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Bench Bar Committee, 2013 to present
    • Montgomery county Bar Association - Judiciary Committee Co-Chair, 2021 to present
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Trial Lawyers Section, 2013 to present
    • Montgomery County Inns of Court - Past President, 2012-2014, Vice President 2011, Treasurer 2010, Secretary 2009
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Piercing the Corporate Veil, Montgomery County Bar Association, April 29, 2025
    • Civility in Practice, Montgomery County Bar Association, February 26, 2025
    • Medical/Legal Issues in Dealing with Behavioral Health Population, Cassatt webinar series, June 27, 2024 and February 29, 2024
    • You Want How Much? The Rising Tide in Case Values, Settlement Demands and Verdicts, Marshall Dennehey Trends in Health Care and Health Law Seminar, May 9, 2024
    • Civility Matters: Ethical Concerns in the Courtroom, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, March 6, 2023
    • Opioid Toxicity and Reversal: Attorney Perspective on Hospital Liability & Patient's Rights, American College of Medical Toxicology Seminar, December 11, 2017
    • Opioids in Civil Proceedings: Perspectives from the Defense, American College of Medical Toxicology Seminar, December 11, 2017
    • Trial Negotiation and Business Skills for Women Trial Attorneys, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, April 11, 2001
    • Treatment and Consent for Minors, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, February 21, 2001
    • Medical Treatment to Minors, Lehigh Valley Risk Management Society, March 1, 2000
    • "Long-Term Health Care Dealt Another Blow," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2017
    • “Nurses: Their Expanding Role as Expert Witnesses,” AgentsofAmerica.org, January 3, 2013
    • “Update on E-Discovery and the Electronic Medical Record,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2012
    • "How to Avoid EMR Legal Pitfalls," The Family Practice News, September 14, 2012
    • “Nurses: Their Expanding Role as Expert Witnesses,” Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2011
    • Defended a hospital in a case involving an alleged failure to diagnose and treat a brainstem stroke. Plaintiff was a 56-year-old man and was "locked in" as a result of the stroke. In addition to issues involving the medical care, plaintiffs were pursuing a corporate liability claim against the hospital. Plaintiff's claim for past and future medical bills and future wage loss was in excess of 17 million dollars. After a four week trial, the jury found in favor of the defense.
    • Defended two obstetricians in a case involving an alleged delay in the performance of a c-section resulting in severe brain damage to the infant. Future medical specials and wage loss were in excess of 145 million dollars. After a four week trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants.
    • Successfully defended a hospital in a wrongful death case. The plaintiff, a 50-year-old man, presented to the ER where he was diagnosed as suffering from a stroke. He received tPA and was transferred to the ICU. Plaintiff alleged there was a failure to monitor, diagnose and treat swelling in the brain and a midline shift that led to the plaintiff's death, three days later. Plaintiff's wage loss claim was in excess of five million dollars.
    • Defended an Institute and two psychologists in a case involving the wrongful death of a child adopted from Russia. Plaintiff alleged in the civil suit that the child sustained massive head injuries and died as a result of alleged abuse by the parents, codefendants in the civil case, and that the psychologists were negligent in failing to suspect the abuse and neglect which ultimately led to his death. The death of the child resulted in significant media exposure and Russia's suspension of adoptions to the United States. The parents were charged with the child's murder and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Defendants settled for a confidential amount; the verdict against the parents was in excess of 14.7 million dollars.   
    • Defended a hospital in a case involving the care and treatment rendered to a patient who, after his discharge, murdered his wife and was then murdered by his son. The story was featured in an ESPN special and Philadelphia Magazine. The case was settled with no payment by the hospital.
    • Entered as trial counsel for a defendant psychiatrist on the second day of trial, with no prior involvement in the case. The claim involved a murder/suicide by a man who was the patient of the psychiatrist. When trial counsel for the defendant psychiatrist became ill in court, the defense moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the request and ordered that another attorney from the firm assume the doctor's representation. After a five day trial, the case went to verdict and the jury found in favor of the defendant.

Results

Plaintiff’s Claims Barred by Statute of Limitations and Immunity Provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

The defense prevailed on preliminary objections in Philadelphia County as the court found that the ​case involved a medical malpractice action involving the plaintiff’s allegations of an alleged assault by three patients while the plaintiff was a patient at a behavioral health hospital. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded ordinary negligence. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were filed by the defendant, raising immunity under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act since there was no claim of gross negligence. After the preliminary objections were filed, the plaintiff attempted to cure the defect in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint, which added allegations of gross negligence and additional facts, in an attempt to support the claim of gross negligence. We again filed preliminary objections, arguing that the allegation of gross negligence was a new cause of action that was now barred by the statute of limitations. Since the amended complaint was filed more than two years after the event at issue and raised a new claim, the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. We also argued that the amended complaint failed to provide any factual support for gross negligence or willful misconduct and, therefore, the hospital was immune from suit. Plaintiff’s counsel did not file a response in opposition. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.