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Case Law Alerts

Where to Draw the Line: Superseding Causes and Duty

Baker v. Bunker Hill Haven Home, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-08-095, 2024-Ohio-875

April 1, 2024

by Jillian L. Dinehart

Todd Howard was a resident at Bunker Hill, a home for wayward boys. He snuck out of the facility to meet with his friends, Zeb Freeman and Derrick Hizer. He snuck out through a path that was well-known to Bunker Hill, but unprotected. The boys got high, then got in Freeman’s vehicle. Only Freeman had permission to drive, but Howard convinced Freeman to let him drive. Howard crashed the vehicle, and Hizer was ejected from the vehicle and died. 

Hizer’s mother sued Bunker Hill, alleging that Bunker Hill was liable in loco parentis and/or for providing lax security procedures that allowed Howard to escape. The court held that the in loco parentis argument failed because Bunker Hill would have needed to be aware of Howard’s “particular vicious propensity” that caused the harm. In this case, simply being aware that Howard wanted his driver’s license was insufficient to foresee that he would operate another’s vehicle. At most, Bunker Hill was aware that Howard would sneak off the property to use marijuana, but that is not the conduct that led to Hizer’s death. 

As to the supervision claim, the court found that there was a clear break in the causal chain, and likely superseding causes, that led to Hizer’s death, including the fact that Hizer chose not to use his seatbelt.  


Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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