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Case Law Alerts

‘I Was Just Following Orders’ Can Support Qualified Immunity Absent Undermining Observations in Ohio

Hall v. Navarre, 118 F.4th 749 (6th Cir.)

January 1, 2025

by Jillian L. Dinehart

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal found that an officer who ticketed a protestor for disorderly conduct, despite not personally witnessing the conduct, had qualified immunity against the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

Mr. Hall was at a protest that spanned across a public street. After multiple requests by police that the protestors disperse, Mr. Hall was tackled by an officer and sustained injury. That officer called for medical assistance, detained Mr. Hall and sat him on the curb with other protestors in zip ties. 

Officer Barr arrived after Mr. Hall had been detained and saw Mr. Hall sitting on the curb. Officer Barr was directed by his supervisor to write all detained persons tickets; however, by the time Officer Barr wrote Mr. Hall’s ticket, Mr. Hall was at the hospital. Officer Barr did not witness the “disorderly conduct” or speak to Mr. Hall. 

The plaintiff alleged Officer Barr wrote the citation out of speech-based retaliatory animus. The court held, after having dismissed the Monell claim, the fact that the officer was ordered to write the citation was critical to the determination of qualified immunity. The court referred to “two poles” that anchor the legal framework for qualified immunity in those instances in which officers defend themselves by referring to an order from a supervisor: 

“At one end is the understanding that an officer cannot benefit from qualified immunity’s shield simply by asserting that he was ‘following orders.’ At the other is the notion that qualified immunity may be warranted when reasonable officers could conclude that they have probable cause for their conduct based on plausible instructions from a supervisor when viewed objectively in light of their own knowledge of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”

Where the conduct is closer to the latter scenario—the officer was acting on plausible instructions from a supervisor was not undermined by circumstances known to the officer—qualified immunity is appropriate. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.