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Case Law Alerts

Clearly Established Constitutional Right: A Fact-Specific, Published Finding Is Necessary to Clearly Establish a “Private Act of Violence”

Linden v. City of Southfield, Michigan, No. 22-1681, Jul. 26, 2023

October 1, 2023

by Jillian L. Dinehart

Emergency medical personnel were granted qualified immunity after pronouncing a person dead, despite her still demonstrating respiratory movement and electrical activity, leading to her transport to a funeral home in a body bag. The Sixth Circuit recently held that it is not a clearly established constitutional violation because there was no precedent to find that transport in a body bag is the equivalent of a private act of violence. 

The decedent in this matter had called 911 for medical aid. When the first responders arrived, they provided medical care but then called a doctor to describe the patient’s signs of life. They received permission to stop resuscitative efforts, even though they had stopped efforts five minutes earlier. The first responders declared the patient dead. 

Family members, police, and even a funeral home employee all questioned the first responders conclusion because the patient was visibly breathing and electrical activity was shown on the first responders’ monitors. The first responders insisted that the respiratory action and the electrical activity were the result of the medication given as part of the resuscitative effort, but that the patient was dead. 

The funeral home employee bagged the body and took it to the funeral home. When the body bag was opened and the body was being prepped for embalming services, the funeral home employee saw that the decedent’s eyes were open and she was breathing. The employee immediately called 911, and a different set of responders transported her to the hospital, where it was discovered the patient had suffered an anoxic brain injury and was in a vegetative state. The patient died one week later. 

The decedent’s estate brought a claim for a constitutional violation of the decedent’s 14th Amendment rights, alleging that the first responders were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs, or that she was subjected to a state-created danger. The district court dismissed the action, and the “state-created danger” claim was appealed. 

The standard for a state-created danger is that the affirmative act of the government agents must create or increase the risk that the decedent would be exposed to “private acts of violence.” The circuit court held that the alleged private act of violence—being transported in a body bag to a funeral home—was not a sufficiently clear violation of constitutional rights such that the first responders could have known that they were in violation. The court compared this to cases where police question an abused child in front of the alleged abusers or disclosing the identity of an undercover officer to the criminal suspects, therefore increasing the likelihood of foreseeable violence against the child or the undercover officer. 

The plaintiff attempted to draw a correlation to cases involving less-obviously criminal consequences. In one of the comparative cases, a state actor prevented a private dive team from rescuing a drowning person and told the private team to wait for the governmental dive team to arrive. However, by the time the government’s team arrived, the drowning victim had died. In that unpublished case, the court held that a “policy of arbitrarily cutting off private source of rescue without providing a meaningful alternative could support a substantive due process claim.” The plaintiff’s argument was that the first responders deprived the decedent of additional medical attention by pronouncing her dead. However, the court found that the first responders were entitled to qualified immunity because the cases cited by plaintiff were unpublished and could not form the basis of a clearly established constitutional right were distinguishable in that the first responders did not actively prevent others from treating the decedent. Ultimately the Sixth Circuit Court held that it was: 

…hard to see how it could be ‘clearly established’ that the first responders exposed (the decedent) to a private act of violence when they mistakenly believed she was dead and left her in her family’s care to be processed for routine funeral proceedings, which included the Funeral Home employee’s act of putting (the) presumed-dead body in a body bag to transport her to a funeral home.”

The dismissal of the case was affirmed, and this opinion was recommended for publication.
 

 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.