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Case Law Alerts

A Graduate Student May Be an Employee for Purposes of Title VII Discrimination.

Huang v. Ohio State University, --- F.4th --- (6th Cir. 2024) (2024 WL 3964007)

October 1, 2024

by Jillian L. Dinehart

A former student in the defendant’s Ph.D. program alleged quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation by a professor/advisor. The Sixth Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was an employee, even though she was also a student. 

While at OSU, the plaintiff filled a graduate research associate position that covered her tuition and fees and offered a small monthly stipend. Professor Rizzoni, the director of the research program, also offered to supplement her stipend through his discretionary funds. The research assistant program classified the plaintiff as an employee. However, she also accepted a graduate fellowship that offered the same benefits and that classified her as a “student.” Despite the change in classification, nothing in her “job description” changed. 

During her three years at OSU, the plaintiff claimed Rizzoni used his power as her Ph.D. advisor, director of the research center, and his distinguished position in their professional field to coerce her to meet with him alone and subjected her to harassment. She described the constant threat that he could expel her from the program, rescind her pay, and ultimately cause her to lose her visa if she did not stay in his good graces. The plaintiff testified that after several years, Rizzoni grew so frustrated by her refusal to submit to his advances that he rushed her Ph.D. candidacy exam, manipulated the examination committee so that it failed her, and then denied her the customary opportunity to retake it. 

Rizzoni denied that he ever touched the plaintiff inappropriately and blames the breakdown of the relationship on her increasing refusal to meet with him, complete Ph.D.-level work and her poor academic performance. The plaintiff testified that she did not report any of the alleged numerous incidents because she “wanted to remain in the Ph.D. program, keep her visa, get her degree, and maintain a good relationship with Rizzoni given his prominence in the field.” The plaintiff did not report the harassment until after she failed her doctoral candidacy exam.

The Sixth Circuit, in finding that it was possible a jury could find that the plaintiff was an “employee,” considered Rizzoni’s ability to control the manner and means by which the plaintiff accomplished the work of her Ph.D. program. The court ignored how the parties characterized the relationship. Where the district court had organized the plaintiff’s tasks into academic and employment, the circuit court held that it was more appropriate to take a more holistic approach. 

In doing so, the circuit court considered that one of the primary purposes of the graduate program was to recruit skilled students, like the plaintiff, to work in the automotive engineering industry, through which the school reaped financial benefits. In contrast, OSU argued that the plaintiff’s compensation was not employment-related because no taxes were withheld. The circuit court reversed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and remanded the matter for additional consideration. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.