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Defense Digest

Getting the Gist: The Evolution and Application of Pennsylvania’s Gist of the Action Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Actions

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

by James D. Greco

Key Points:

  • While legal malpractice actions can be brought as a negligence or contract claim, the gist of the action doctrine serves to limit those instances. 
  • Application of the doctrine can be used to prevent shopping for favorable limitations periods.

For litigators defending colleagues in legal malpractice actions, the prospect of being faced with causes of action for negligence and breach of contract is not out of the ordinary. Most often, legal malpractice suits involve claims for negligence and breach of contract, and it is well settled that such actions may be brought in either form. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, simply because they “may” be brought in either form does not ipso-facto mean they should. That is where the gist of the action doctrine comes into play, preventing plaintiffs from recasting torts claims as breach of contract and vice versa. The application of the doctrine can be a helpful tool in malpractice litigation, often used as an offensive tactic, preventing plaintiffs from shopping for favorable limitations periods.

The gist of the action doctrine has evolved significantly since the early 1990s. Surfacing in Bash v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 601 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 1992), the court analyzed a plaintiff’s claims that sought damages for emotional distress, mental anguish, embarrassment, and depression for a defendant’s alleged failure to perform a contract duty. The pleading of tort damages as a result of an alleged failure to comply with an advertising contract found Pennsylvania’s Superior Court looking to the federal courts for an analysis of the difference between a tort and a contract. Following the guidance of the federal bench, the Bash court noted that to be construed as a tort, the wrong ascribed must be the gist of the action, the contract being collateral. Bash, 601 A.2d at 829. It was based on this language that the court opined that the obligations at issue were a matter of contract law, not tort, resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

The doctrine later evolved in 2002, with the Superior Court’s decision in eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 15 (Pa. Super. 2002), where the court first analyzed the doctrine’s application to claims for fraud. Recognizing the various, yet similar, ways courts throughout the Commonwealth applied the doctrine, the eToll court opined that their analysis hinged on whether the alleged fraud concerned the performance of contractual duties. 

Analyzing allegations that the appellant engaged in fraudulent schemes in the course of the parties’ contractual relationship, the eToll court noted that the alleged acts arose in the course of the parties’ contractual relationship and that the duties at issue were grounded in that contract. Thus, the court concluded the claims were “inextricably intertwined,” or that the gist of the action lay in contract. Again, the doctrine evolved. What started as a consideration as to the source of the duty in question turned to whether the actions in question were so tangential, or slightly connected, to the parties’ contractual relationship. 

After eToll, varying approaches were taken with respect to the doctrine’s application. Bash’s approach being used in some matters, while the “inextricably intertwined” approach of eToll being used in others. The Commonwealth Court, too, had its own analysis, using a “misfeasance vs. nonfeasance” approach. Where there was “misfeasance,” being the breach of a duty imposed by the law of social policy, the gist of the action sounded in tort. For “nonfeasance,” or breach of a duty under the terms of the contract, the action sounded in contract.

This mixed-bag approach continued until the Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court decision in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), where the court recognized that, at the core of the doctrine, the critical determinative factor is the duty that is alleged to have been breached. As the Supreme Court opined:

… the substance of the allegations comprising a claim in a plaintiff’s complaint are of paramount importance, and, thus, the mere labeling by the plaintiff of a claim as being in tort, e.g., for negligence, is not controlling. If the facts of a particular claim establish that the duty breached is one created by the parties by the terms of their contract—i.e., a specific promise to do something that a party would not ordinarily have been obligated to do but for the existence of the contract—then the claim is to be viewed as one for breach of contract. If, however, the facts establish that the claim involves the defendant’s violation of a broader social duty owed to all individuals, which is imposed by the law of torts and, hence, exists regardless of the contract, then it must be regarded as a tort.

Bruno, 106 A.3d at 68 (2014).
     
Having evolved from Bash to Bruno, application of the doctrine to a legal malpractice action was more-recently analyzed in Outerlimits Techs., LLC v. O’Connor, 311 A.3d 569 (Pa. Super. 2023), where the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action based solely in breach of contract. In its opinion, the trial court noted:

[defendant’s] shortcomings constitute a failure to exercise the requisite skill and knowledge that is expected of all attorneys. Therefore, while Appellee failed to adhere to the general standard of care lawyers owe to every client, Appellee did not breach a specific contractual provision or promise. In line with Pennsylvania case law, an action in assumpsit simply was not available to Appellant. As such, any genuine issue of fact as to whether an implied contract existed is immaterial because, regardless, Appellee failed to adhere to a generalized standard of care.

Outerlimits, 311 A.3d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2023). The appellate court agreed, relying on Bruno and noting the contract in question was merely a vehicle creating the relationship between the parties, during which counsel allegedly committed malpractice, as opposed to the breach of a duty specifically created by the contract.

This decision further supports the position that, while legal malpractice actions can sound in both tort and contract, it is not always the case. While attorneys do owe a general standard of care to their clients, this does not make every malpractice action sound in contract simply based on the relationship between the parties. Bruno continues to dictate that the key to the analysis in all matters is the source of the duty allegedly breached. In a profession such as the law, where relationships are defined by both written and oral contracts, such a differentiation is key. In situations where both claims are brought, or even actions where one such claim is brought improperly, preliminary objections or dispositive motions raising the doctrine can help limit a client’s exposure.

After years of evolution and application, we would all like to think that we are finally getting the gist. But, uncertainty lurks in the form of the pending Superior Court decision in Poteat v. Asteak, a legal malpractice action involving a breach of a contract allegedly implicitly imposing a duty to provide services consistent with the profession at large. On appeal in Poteat, the Superior Court disagreed with the lower court’s use of the gist of action doctrine to re-characterize the claim as one sounding in tort. Id., 2024 WL 1202926 (Pa. Super. Mar. 21, 2024). Undoubtedly signaling the far-reaching implications of its decision, the Superior Court’s opinion was subsequently withdrawn and the matter submitted for reargument en banc. See Poteat, 2024 WL 2813104 (Pa. Super. June 3, 2024). 

And now, we wait. The Poteat decision will be yet another event in the continuing evolution of the gist of the action doctrine. Without question, it will have a significant impact on the doctrine’s application in legal malpractice actions, potentially requiring further instruction from the Supreme Court to ensure we all are truly getting the gist.

*Jim is a member of our Professional Liability Department and works in our Scranton, PA office. 



 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.