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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Third District’s Decision Confirms that the Future of Florida’s Pre-Suit Notice Requirement Remains Uncertain

Legal Update for Insurance Services - February 22, 2024

February 22, 2024

by Carolin A. Pacheco

The Third District Court of Appeals of Florida is the latest to join the growing number of Florida appellate courts that have ruled that the pre-suit notice provision of section 627.70152 is procedural in nature and, as such, applies retroactively to policies in existence prior to the statute’s effective date of July 1, 2021. 

In February 2024, the Third District ruled in Cantens v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London that section 627.70152 evinces a clear legislative intent to apply to all property insurance policies and its retroactive application would not impact a substantive right of the insureds.

In Cantens, the insured filed suit for breach of contract against its homeowners insurance carrier. However, they failed to file the statutorily mandated notice of intent to initiate litigation to the Division of Financial Services. The lower court granted the insurance company’s motion to dismiss based on the insured’s failure to file this pre-suit notice, and the insured appealed the decision.

In reaching its decision, the Third District aligned itself with the Fourth District Court of Appeals, which came to an analogous decision last year. 

In May 2023, the Fourth District Court of Appeals found that the pre-suit notice as mandated by Florida Statute 627.70152 does apply retroactively to insurance policies entered into before the statute’s effective date. 

In Herman Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company, the court was asked to determine whether the trial court wrongfully dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit for homeowners insurance benefits upon granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement established in section 627.70152. The Fourth District Court affirmed, finding that because the pre-suit notice requirement of section 627.70152 applies retroactively as a procedural provision, it applies to existing policies in effect at the time of enactment. In its opinion, the court found that the legislature expressed a clear intent for the statute to apply retroactively by expressly stating that this statute “applies exclusively to all suits...arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy....”

Resolution of this issue is far from over, and the appellate courts are increasingly looking to the Florida Supreme Court for guidance. 

In November 2023, the Sixth District Court of Appeal of Florida, in direct conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida, found that the pre-suit notice as mandated by Florida Statute 627.70152 does not apply retroactively to insurance policies entered into before the statute’s effective date. 

Notably, the Sixth District’s ruling in the case of Hughes v. Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company focused on the retroactive applicability of a statutory pre-suit notice requirement enacted after an insurance policy was issued, but before a breach of contract lawsuit regarding that policy was filed. Holding that section 627.70152 does not apply retroactively to an insurance policy entered into before the statute’s effective date, the court concluded that there was no clear evidence of legislative intent for the statute to apply retroactively and that the statute was substantive in nature, therefore, making its retroactive application unconstitutional.

The key analysis in these cases remains closely influenced by the precedent established by the Florida Supreme Court ruling in Menendez v. Progressive Express Insurance Co., 35 So. 3d 873 (Fla. 2010), which involved an amendment to a different statutory scheme, where the court held that a statutory pre-suit notice requirement was a substantive change that could not be applied retroactively to policies issued before the amendment’s effective date.

While the number of cases this particular statute applies to grow smaller as we head further away from the short window of time a number of claims were filed before the 2021 statute took effect, the plaintiff and defense bar remain optimistic that the Florida Supreme Court will settle the issue. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Services, February 22, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.