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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Raise it or Waive it! In Order to Preserve Appeal, You Must Raise the Issues at the Trial Court Level

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2026

June 11, 2026

by Carolin A. Pacheco

Homeowner's Choice Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Deborah Oakes No. 4D2024-1873, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D485a (Fla. 4th DCA March 18, 2026)

The Fourth District Court of Appeals rendered an opinion finding that you must raise issues at the trial court level in order to preserve the issue for appeal, affirming the trial court’s final judgment. Through this opinion, the court provides an instructive examination of policy interpretation issues and further highlights the importance of preserving legal arguments at the trial level.

Homeowners brought breach of contract action against property insurer Homeowners Choice in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, after the insurer denied coverage for damage to their house allegedly caused by an abrupt collapse. After trial of this breach of contract action, the court found, in reliance on holding by Fifth District Court of Appeals in Kings Ridge Community Ass'n v. Sagamore Insurance Co., that "additional collapse coverage" provided by policy could not be modified or qualified in any manner by other listed exclusions except those specifically contained within the "additional collapse" coverage provision. The magistrate issued a report and recommendation concluding that insured’s motion for partial summary judgment should be granted. The jury entered verdict in favor of insured and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the insurer raised several issues concerning the interpretation of the insurance policy. However, the Fourth District Court found that the insurer's attorney failed to preserve these legal issues for appellate review during the trial proceedings. As noted within the opinion, one of the most common reasons behind a per curiam affirmance without written opinion is the appellant's failure to preserve issues for review. In this instance, the court was compelled to specifically address the preservation issue "to flesh out its requirements" as guidance for the bar. Namely, they examined the terms of the policy in detail specifically as to Section I, which contains four parts: (1) Property Coverages; (2) Perils Insured Against; (3) Exclusions; and (4) Conditions. The court paid special attention to the “Additional Coverages – Collapse” provision, as the policy expressly excludes collapse coverage except as provided in this section. The policy also includes endorsement that completely replaces the “Additional Coverages” section of the policy when a catastrophic ground cover collapse occurs. Ultimately, the court agreed with the  homeowner that the only exclusions that apply relative to the additional coverage for collapse are the exclusions that are expressly stated within the additional coverage provision, while insurer failed to provide a substantive argument against insured’s interpretation of the policy or against the applicability of Kings Ridge.

In affirming  the trial court’s judgment, the Fourth District Court noted that even after having the opportunity to address the policy interpretation issues at a hearing on the insurer’s exceptions to the magistrate’s report before trial, the insurer failed to properly raise arguments against the homeowner’s policy interpretation and instead focused on issues of fact as to whether the collapse was abrupt. The insurer largely failed to refute the homeowner’s actual argument for partial summary judgment concerning the inapplicability of general exceptions or exclusions based on the policy language. The insurer made a different argument than the arguments it made to advance on appeal.

On appeal, the insurer argued that the text and structure of the policy and “well-reasoned case law” demonstrate that the general exclusions apply to all coverages, including additional coverage. Further, the insurer argued that the reasoning in Kings Ridge was distinguishable. It is noteworthy that the insurer did not present the trial court with these arguments and thus failed to preserve the arguments for appellate review. The lesson the Fourth District Court seeks to provide in taking the time to write this opinion is that particularly when an insurer believes the policy language supports its coverage position, it must properly raise those arguments during trial or the risk waiver on appeal. Core legal arguments must be raised with clarity and specificity, and the court rejects that notion that vague comments can substitute for clear and specific legal objections.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.