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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Pennsylvania Superior Court Strikes Down the Regular Use Exclusion

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – October 25, 2021

October 25, 2021

by Patricia A. Monahan

Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, No. 1443 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. Oct. 22, 2021)

In an October 22, 2021, precedential panel decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange extended the reasoning of Gallagher v. Geico Indemn. Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019), to the regular use exclusion for UM/UIM coverage. In Gallagher, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that stacking applies to UM/UIM claims unless a waiver of stacked coverage was executed under §1738 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The household exclusion that traditionally applied to preclude stacking of a resident relative’s policy was eroded. The Superior Court has now similarly held in Rush that underinsured motorist coverage may only be precluded by the waiver process under §1731 of the MVFRL, and not by a policy exclusion.
  
In Rush, a City of Easton police detective was injured in an automobile accident caused by two negligent tortfeasors while he was driving his police vehicle that he regularly used for work. The Easton automobile policy provided for $35,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. Having received the limits of the tortfeasors’ policies and the $35,000 limits of the Easton policy, the detective sought underinsured motorist coverage from Erie pursuant to two insurance policies that covered three personal vehicles and provided for $750,000 in total stacked underinsured motorist coverage.

Erie denied the underinsured motorist claim, citing the regular use exclusion applicable to bodily injury resulting from the use of a non-owned vehicle that was not identified on the Erie policies. The detective then filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County against Erie contending that the regular use exclusion violated the MVFRL. The exclusion provided:  

This insurance does not apply to:

Bodily injury to ‘you’ or a ‘resident’ using a non-owned ‘motor vehicle’ or a ‘non-owned’ miscellaneous vehicle which is regularly use by ‘you’ or a ‘resident’, but not insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage under this policy.

Rush, Slip op. at p. 2-3.

The trial court held the regular use exclusion unenforceable under the MVFRL and entered summary judgment in favor of the detective. Erie appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed.
 
The Superior Court held that absent an express waiver of coverage under 75 Pa.C.S. §1731, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage must be provided in an amount equal to the bodily injury liability limits. The court reasoned that the regular use exclusion “conflicts with the broad language of Section 1731(c), which requires UIM coverage in those situations where an insured is injured arising out of the ‘use of a motor vehicle.’” Rush, at p. 7. It rejected Erie’s reliance upon Williams v. GEICO Gov’t Emp. Ins. Co., 32 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2011), despite the identical facts presented therein.

In Williams, a state trooper injured while occupying a police vehicle not identified on his personal GEICO policy was precluded from recovering underinsured motorist benefits due to the regular use exclusion in his policy. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded therein that the insured had failed to meet his high burden of establishing that the regular use exclusion violated the public policy supporting the MVFRL. The Superior Court in Rush read the public policy holding of Williams as not controlling. Interestingly, the Rush panel also rejected Williams’s express statement that the regular use exclusion did not violate the express terms of the MVFRL, holding that it was mere dicta.  Rush further rejected Erie’s reliance upon Erie Ins. Exch. v. Baker, 972 A.2d 507 (Pa. 2008), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had enforced the regular use exclusion, finding that Gallagher had abrogated that decision. 
 
Since Gallagher, and prior to Rush, numerous federal judges had rejected the argument that the regular use exclusion contravened the MVFRL. The Honorable Edward G. Smith identified several such decisions recently in Eberly v. LM General Ins. Co., 2021 WL 4284521 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2021). In that case, the regular use exclusion precluded the plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits arising out of an accident that occurred while he was operating his employer’s vehicle. Judge Smith held that Gallagher was not controlling as it applied to stacking and not to regular use exclusions. He also recognized the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Burstein v. Prudential Property and Cas Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204 (Pa. 2002), which held that the regular use exclusion comported with the policies underlying the MVFRL. Burstein was also reaffirmed in Williams.

The Rush decision has immediate and wide-sweeping ramifications for the insurance industry. Unless there is a stay, all claims for uninsured or underinsured motorists benefits that have been denied based upon the regular use exclusion, and which are within the applicable statute of limitations, may become payable. The panel decision in Rush may be appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where review is discretionary. If an appeal is not successful, it is likely that only a legislative change will be able to reduce an insurer’s risk of exposure to uninsured and underinsured motorist claims arising from the use of motor vehicles, including motorcycles, of which the insurer is unaware and has no control.
 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – October 25, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.

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New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

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Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.