.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

In a Win for Insurers, the Florida Supreme Court Affirms that Carriers Are Bound Only By the Express Terms of the Contract

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - February 2, 2021

February 2, 2021

by Corey K. Setterlund

On January 21, 2021, the Florida Supreme Court rendered a decision in Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Manor House, LLC (No. SC19-1394) related to bad faith and consequential damages in a breach of contract action. This case came to the court from the Fifth District, which certified the following questions of great public importance: “In a first-party breach of insurance contract brought by an insured against an insurer, not involving suit under section 624.155, Florida Statutes, does Florida Law allow the insured to recover extra-contractual damages, consequential damages?”

This case involved a first-party breach of insurance contract claim where the insureds, Manor House, LLC, Ocean View, LLC and Merritt, LLC (Manor House), sought to recover extra-contractual, consequential damages for lost rental income totaling approximately $2.5 million from the insurer, Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Citizens). In August 2007, Manor House filed suit demanding prompt payment of the allegedly “undisputed” amount of $6.4 million and requesting the court to compel Citizens to engage in the policy-provided appraisal procedures. In addition, Manor House filed suit against Citizens alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. On the breach claim, Manor House alleged that Citizens failed to: (1) properly adjust the loss; (2) pay the undisputed amount after estimates; (3) honor Manor House’s demand for appraisal; (4) provide Manor House with documents it needed to adjust the loss; and (5) timely pay the appraisal award. Manor House sought to recover extra-contractual damages related to rental income it allegedly lost due to the delay in repairing the apartment complex based on Citizens’ procrastination in adjusting and paying Manor House’s claims.

The trial court granted Citizens’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding the breach of contract claim for lost rental income. On appeal, Manor House challenged, among other orders, the trial court’s order granting Citizens’ motion for partial summary judgment to prevent Manor House from pursuing a claim for extra-contractual, consequential damages. The Fifth District reversed the partial summary judgment regarding the consequential damages claim. The Fifth District concluded that when an insurer breaches an insurance contract, the insured is entitled to recover more than the pecuniary loss involved in the balance of the payments due under the policy in consequential damages, provided the damages were in contemplation of the parties at the inception of the contract. The Fifth District further concluded that while Citizens is immune from bad faith claims, the consequential damages Manor House sought were based squarely on breach of contract claims requiring no allegation or proof that Citizens acted in bad faith.

The Florida Supreme Court quashed the Fifth District’s decision and remanded the case based on the certified question of whether Florida law allows the insured to recover extra-contractual, consequential damages in a first-party breach of insurance contract action brought by an insured against its insurer, not involving suit under section 624.155, Florida Statutes. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that extra-contractual, consequential damages are not available in a first-party breach of insurance contract action because the contractual amount due to the insured is the amount owed pursuant to the express terms and conditions of the policy. The court confirmed that extra-contractual damages are available in a separate bad faith action pursuant to section 624.155, but Citizens in the instant case was statutorily immune from first-party bad faith claims.

This case further solidifies that insurance contracts are interpreted based on their express terms and conditions and the Florida courts are not going to force insurance carriers to pay for more than they specifically bargained for when issuing insurance coverage to their insureds. Specifically, this case conveys that parties to an insurance contract cannot “contemplate” remedies but, in fact, are bound only by the express terms of the contract. Importantly, the court does not state that extra-contractual damages cannot be obtained once the carrier’s liability is determined. Consequential damages can still be sought through a bad faith action, which can only be brought once an insured is successful in their underlying breach of contract lawsuit. Only once coverage is determined and the carrier is found to have wrongfully (1) denied the claim or (2) underpaid the claim, can an insured proceed to attempt recovery of extra-contractual damages from their carrier.

The court was clear when it determined, based on Citizens’ unique position of being a government entity, that Citizens can avoid having such extra-contractual damages asserted against them as they are immune from bad faith litigation. However, private insurance companies do not receive the same immunity and can end up paying for extra contractual damages in a second lawsuit, which has a more liberal discovery process and greater exposure to damages that were not contemplated when the parties entered into the insurance contract. Thus, if insureds are seeking consequential or any other extra-contractual damages, they must first be successful in proving the insurance carrier wrongfully denied or underpaid them, and then must prove they suffered damages that were not specifically provided for under the express terms of the insurance contract.

 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services - February 2, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.